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July 2003 
 
 
 
 In recent decades the problems posed by modern genetics has increasingly 
become a subject of debate within the social sciences. Those debates lead us to 
ask whether genetics is strictly a scientific endeavor.  That begs a further 
question which forms the focus of this study: What else is modern genetics 
besides being a scientific concern? The aim of the thesis, therefore, is to begin to 
ask what genetic science really is. In order to achieve that goal the thesis seeks to 
examine gene technology through Foucaultian eyes. With that in mind Chapter I 
sketches an interpretation of Michel Foucault’s theoretical position. On the basis 
of that chapter, it can be argued that he conceives of power as the painstaking 
control of the life conditions of the body. Such a conceptualization of power 
interprets the government of the body both in terms of the tactics of domination 
and in terms of the techniques of the self. Chapter 2, by showing the way in 
which he applied this conceptualization to historical experiences provides us 
 ii 
with an intriguing perspective through which to consider what modern genetics 
is. That archaeological approach conceives the constitution of new modalities of 
power in terms of dislocations and discursive transformations. Chapter 3 seeks to 
apply that interpretation of Foucault to modern genetics. As a result of such a 
reading, it is argued that modern genetics is not only a scientific concern, but 
also a new technique of the self (ethopolitics) and a new tactic of domination 
(molecular politics.)  
 
 
Key Words: Michel Foucault, Knowledge-power, Gaze-power, Discourse, Self, 
Archaeology, Genetic Science, Eugenics, Genetic Counseling, Molecular risk, Somatic 
individual, Submicroscopic level, Molecular politics, Ethopolitics. This study also 
provides new conceptualizations for further studies such as; Homo-ethopoliticus, 
Molecular perfection, Molecular norm and Genetico-medical discourse.  
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 Son yıllarda modern genetiğin ortaya koyduğu sorunlar sosyal bilimlerin bir 
konusu haline gelmiştir. Bu tartışmalar genetiğin sadece bir bilimsel çaba olup 
olmadığını sorgulamamıza neden olmaktadır. Bu ise bu tezin odağını oluşturan 
bir başka soruyu gündeme getirir: Modern genetik bilimsel bir ilgi olmanın 
dışında ne olabilir? Sonuç olarak bu calışmanın amacı genetiğin gerçekte ne 
olduğunu sormaya başlamaktır. Bu amaca ulaşmak için bu tez genetiği 
Foucaultca bir gözle inceler. Bu çerçevede birinci bölüm Foucault’nun teorik 
pozisyonu yorumlar. İlk bölüm uyarınca Foucault’nun gücü vücudun yaşam 
koşullarının detaylı bir kontrolü olarak algıladığı söyleneblir. Gücün böyle bir 
kavramsallaştırması bedenin yönetimini hakimiyet taktikleri ve benlik 
teknolojileri temelinde yorumlar. İkinci bölüm Foucault’ nun bu 
kavramsallaştırmayı tarihsel tecrübeler üzerine nasıl uyguladığını göstermek 
suretiyle modern genetiğin nasıl analiz edilmesi gerektiğini ortaya koyar. Bu 
arkaeolojik bakış yeni güç modlarının oluşumunu söylemsel dönüşümler ve yer 
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bozmalar temelinde algılar. Üçüncü bölüm Foucault’ nun bu yorumunu genetik 
üzerine uygulamaya çalışır. Böyle bir okumanın sonucunda genetiğin sadece 
blimsel bir çaba olmadığı fakat bunun yanında yeni bir benlik teknolojisi 
(etopolitik) ve yeni bir hakimiyet taktiği olduğu söylenebilir (moleküler politik). 
 
 
Key Words: Michel Foucault, Bilgi-Güç, Bakış-Güç, Söylem, Benlik, Arkaeoloji, Genetik 
Bilim, Öjenizm, Genetik Danışmanlık, Moleküler Risk, Somatik Birey, Submikroskopik 
Düzey, Moleküler Politik, Etopolitik. Ek olarak bu calışma daha sonraki çalışmalara 
yardımcı olabilecek bazı yeni kavramsallaştırmalar sunmaktadır: Homo-etopolitikus, 
Moleküler Mükemmellik, Moleküler Norm  ve Genetiko-medikal Söylem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In recent decades the social science literature has increasingly turned its attention to the 
issues raised by advances of gene technology. This new technology, briefly, is the 
control of the DNA and reproduction. In other words, the main aim of this new 
technology is to replace accidental reproduction with rational mutation.   
 
Both these current aims and the possible future applications of gene technology may 
add some new elements to the very definition of humankind. Henceforward, for 
modern genetics, it is no longer meaningful to talk about man as an individual. Similarly, 
according to modern genetics, the specie is not meaningful, either. Both the specie and 
the individual are displaced by the history of gene pools and perfect machines that genes 
use in order to survive.  
     
Indeed, the debate over gene technology and human cloning, was exacerbated by the 
birth of Dolly, the first cloned mammal of the world. Through this cloned mammal the 
possibility of cloning adult mammals was revealed. As some have noted (see Heinberg, 
1999:94) the implications of this new possibility were clear. As Heinberg (1999:94) 
noted, “… humans could be cloned, too…For more than a decade, leading scientists 
had insisted that the cloning of adult animals was out of question. Suddenly it seemed as 
though the possibilities were limitless.” 
 
The possibility of cloning living organisms and more importantly cloning  human beings 
and the reduction of man into a selfish gene have raised several questions coming from 
a variety of sources such as political, social, religious, ethical and economic spheres. 
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These concerns force us to ask whether or not genetic science has an orbit that is 
different from its scientific orbit. Put differently, the debate over gene technologies 
leads us to ask whether or not genetics is a pure scientific product. 
 
 Clearly, this is the very point on which social scientists have much to say. However, the 
existing literature on genetics primarily focuses on the possible socio-political 
consequences of genetic science. Clearly that endeavor is of crucial importance. 
Nonetheless, there is one thing that must be done long before arriving directly to the 
assessments of consequences of the widespread use of this technique. The primary 
concern of this thesis, therefore, is to attempt to reveal exactly what gene technology is. 
It is asserted that best way to reveal the underground reality of genetic science is to 
interpret it through Foucaultian eyes. More precisely, examining genetics by 
extrapolating from Foucault’s work on madness, discipline, punishment, sexuality and 
clinic. 
 
On account of this assertion, Chapter I intends to capture the general approach of 
Michel Foucault by exploring the basic building blocks he used while constructing his 
theoretical stance. In other words, Chapter I examines what a Foucaultian reading 
actually entails. Therefore, it will provide us with the basic theoretical ground that is 
necessary to choose a path in order to investigate gene technology.   
 
On the other hand, Chapter II represents how Foucault practiced and applied this 
theoretical standing to concrete examples that are the historical experiences. Put 
differently, the second chapter, by showing the way in which Foucault dealt with the 
historical experiences in accordance with his theory, reveals the path that we will use to 
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analyze genetic science. This path attempts to make sense of Foucault’s archaeological 
approach. 
 
 Succinctly, an archaeological reading differs from a historical reading insofar as it 
concentrates on dislocations and transformations, as seriously as it does on continuities 
and locations. I would prefer to call these dislocations breakdown points and /or 
archaeological turning points that are positive and creative elements of history. These 
breakdowns reveal a knowledge-power structure making the individual the subject of 
several discursive formations in relation with non-discursivities.  Consequently, the first 
chapter deals with Foucault’s re-theorization of power as a hypothetical construction, 
whereas the second chapter deals with the way he converted his hypothetical 
construction into practical observations.  
 
Equipped with such theoretical, we are in a position to ask whether genetics is not only 
a scientific concern. Moreover, that leads us to ask, if genetics is not only a scientific 
endeavor then what is it? Chapter III deals with this question. In that chapter, the 
science of gene is exposed to an archaeological reading. Such a reading reveals that the 
science of gene, more important than being a science, is the new apparatus of modern 
power and a new ethical substance by which life is re-visualized at submicroscopic 
levels. The individual subject is subjected to the painstaking control of his microscopic 
information and his molecular soma. Thus, gene technology beckons the transformation 
of biopolitics into molecular politics. Besides, archaeologizing genetics reveals that the 
science of the gene also functions as the new technology of the self by which the 
individual subject turns into the homo-ethopoliticus who understands that he is a molecular 
soma and who realizes that he is responsible for his molecular living.  
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In accordance with these arguments, it is claimed that genetic science is not simply a 
scientific endeavor deriving from scientific wonders and questions. Instead, it is the new 
strategy of a complex power net, which started to exercise itself by 18th century through 
the discovery of population as an economic and political being with several manageable 
variables.   
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CHAPTER I  
 
FOUCAULT’S MAIN ARGUMENT 
 
In order understand what genetics is and to do so from a Foucaultian perspective, it will 
be necessary to begin in this first chapter by providing an account of Foucault’s basic 
theoretical position. Based on that we can then consider how he deals with historical 
experiences (Chapter II) and subsequently apply that Foucaultian understanding to 
recent developments in gene technology (Chapter III).   
 
As a very well known fact, Foucault is neither a theoretician nor a builder of a theory 
that has short cut and clear ways to complete the puzzle. His perspective is very 
comprehensive and therefore one always bears the risk of being drowned in Foucault. 
In order to lower this risk as much as possible, in this study, a somewhat schematic 
thinking depending on some specific questions is attempted. It must be noted that such 
an endeavor neither has an aim to reduce Foucaultian perspective into a theory nor to 
categorize Foucault. Instead it is just a methodological tool that will helps us to 
gradually narrow the discussion from Foucault’s general ideas to his more specific 
points. 
 
In brief, it can be said that to constitute a perspective and to deal with historical 
experiences within this perspective, Foucault uses four crucial concepts: power, truth, 
discourse, and knowledge. Among these concepts there are mutual and firmly 
interrelated relations moving in a somewhat circular network.  It is almost impossible to 
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separate them from each other at an empirical and at a social formation level. To 
methodologically simplify the network among these concepts, this study moves 
gradually from two dimensions. The first dimension is power and the relation between 
power and knowledge including other relevant elements. The second dimension is 
discourse and its relation with normality standards including other relevant elements.  
 
1.1 POWER 
 
 
As an initiation, it may be possible to say that Foucault starts with power. His purpose, 
as he said (1980:145) (and as Walzer also notes (1986)), “…is not to formulate the 
global systematic theory which holds everything in place, but to analyze the specificity 
of mechanisms of power...” As a matter of the fact, in Foucault’s hands power takes a 
form very different from the classical approaches. First of all power is not something 
that is acquired and accumulated in and by a particular group or structure. Instead it is 
exercised in and employed by almost endless points through a netlike organization.  
 
This conceptualization of power immediately makes the formulation of power 
impossible in terms of sovereignty. As noted by Foucault (1980:102), “…we must 
escape from the limited field of juridical sovereignty and State institutions and instead 
base our analysis of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination.” 
This new type of power is not formulated in sovereign terms and accordingly it cannot 
be reduced to the control of privileged persons over others. Instead it is a complex 
mechanism that manages and administrates the life processes in a much more detailed 
manner.  For that reason, Foucault does not question why certain people want to 
dominate. Instead he focuses on the continuous subjugation and uninterrupted 
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processes of power that structure our bodies, direct our behaviors and govern our 
gestures (Foucault, 1980:97) 
 
Through structuring and governing of the very details of the individual subject and the 
life itself, this new power intensifies its efficiency and stabilizes its functioning. 
Concisely, power is in endless network, it is comprehensive and it has tiny channels 
through which to diffuse itself. Thus, from Foucault’s perspective this new power hides 
behind the control of the very details of everyday life and life processes.  As he puts it 
(1980:39),  
 
But in thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its 
capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very 
grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their 
actions, and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes, and everyday 
lives. The 18th cc invented a synaptic regime of power, a regime of its 
exercise within the social body, rather than from above it. 
 
We have a necessary outcome here. If power seems like water flowing through capillary-
like channels and if it inserts itself into the everyday lives, then it must be productive. In 
other words, it must have a positive task. This new type of power beckons to a new 
mode of investment of life and the individual.  After all, it is not any more the control 
by repression and prohibition. Instead, it exercises its control by creating, producing and 
stimulating.  For that reason Foucault (1980:119) contends that,  
 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact 
that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it 
traverses and produces things, it means to be considered as a productive 
network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a 
negative instance whose function is repression. 
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At this very point, at least, the kind of power we are dealing with in Foucaultian terms 
strikes the eye. A power that is productive and positive. It is hidden in the very details of 
everyday life and the individual subject.  
 
1.2 KNOWLEDGE AND POWER 
 
 
As has been already noted, this study uses two dimensions as a methodological tool, one 
of which is power and knowledge and other of which is a discourse and normality 
standards. In the case of the first dimension power and knowledge are not free from 
each other. More explicitly, Foucault’s representation of power cannot be separated 
from the retheorization of history of knowledges. His understanding of power primarily 
depends on his analysis of knowledge and the forms it has taken throughout history. He 
explicitly states that (1980:52), 
 
Knowledge and power are integrated into each other, and there is no 
point in dreaming of an aim when knowledge will cease to depend on 
power…It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, 
it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power.  
 
As a result it is possible to say that knowledge and power are interrelated. In order to 
exercise its control power needs knowledge. Similarly, as many commentators have 
noted (for example, Lemert and Gilan, 1982:60), without the exercise of power, 
knowledge cannot be defined and it becomes unformed and shapeless. In this close and 
strong relationship, the point is that power produces knowledge. Foucault argued that 
(1980:51), “…we should add that the exercise of power itself creates and causes to 
emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information.” 
Similarly he states that (1980:52) “…the exercise of power perpetually cerates 
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knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power.” Thus, 
there is a mutually functioning relation between power and knowledge. It is the fact that 
power constitutes bodies and fields of knowledge and knowledge in turn constitutes and 
intensifies the effects of power relations.  
 
There are two main questions one can direct to this relation of power and knowledge. 
Why does power constitute knowledge and how does power constitute knowledge? For 
the former, the answer is the control itself. Knowledge is the necessary ground for 
power upon which it exercises its control. As many have noted (McHaul and Grace, 
1995; 60, McNay, 1994; 64), knowledge has a role in the reproduction of relations of 
subjection and domination. Concisely, knowledge is power. In that case, then, to know 
is necessarily to control. In other words, to know is the exercise of control and 
subjection.  As Lemert and Gilan put (1982:77), “…the desire to know is a form of 
knowledge in which to know life is also to control it” 
 
 Through the example of Christian schools of the La Salle given by McHaul and Grace 
(1995:75), why power constitutes knowledge becomes much more clear.  
 
For instance, it is the knowledge formulated in the Christian schools of 
the La Salle, in which the body is subjected to the regime of pedagogy. It 
is a knowledge that produces a docile body, taught by turning its own 
forces against itself. This knowledge is a power. It intensifies efficiency 
and productivity of the body.  
 
Actually, it may be deduced from Foucault’s ideas that the main aim of power is the 
social control. Social control, due to the normalization of both society at the macro level 
and the individual at the micro level, works towards the creation of a population 
composed of healthy and normal individuals. That is achieved by getting rid of social 
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misfits. Control is therefore meaningful. Control is the social control. As Walzer put it 
(1986:64) “… knowledge derives from and provides the grounds for social control: 
every particular form of knowledge.” Social control seeks to eliminate improper 
elements from the society.  
 
At this very point genetics should be given comprehensive attention. Up to now, to 
provide social control and to define social misfits, power has used every imaginable 
channel from madness to criminality. The only channel that power has not used thus far 
is genetics. As we will see, the usage of genetics as one of the normalization mechanisms 
creates a much more fine tuned means to discriminate between individuals. Moreover, if 
it is knowledge and accumulation of bodies of knowledge that provide the necessary 
ground for power, then genetics would be an extremely effective power channel since it 
provides the most reliable information of the history of individual subjects.  Thus, to 
know without any hesitation would turn into the control without any obstacles.  
 
Finally, power produces knowledge because to know is also to control. In other words, 
it is this knowledge that enables power to exercise control over the population and the 
individual. There exists, as Lucas put (1992:137), therefore, “…a power-knowledge 
structure which defines and indeed creates the individual”  
 
At that point, in order not to cause any misunderstanding, it should be noted that by 
claiming that power produces knowledge, and that this production provides social 
control and domination through normalization, does not mean that power successfully 
penetrates and shapes individuals. This study does not question the level of success of 
power. Besides, for Foucault individuals are not simple social agents. In Foucault there 
exists a space for the individual, which is resistance. However, it does not mean that 
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human subjects are fully free, either. Thus, as Walzer puts it (1986:61), “…there is for 
him no such thing as a free human subject, no natural man or woman. Men and women 
are always social creations, the products of codes and disciplines.”  
 
Besides, resistance is necessary for power. It means power must allow some resistance. 
Because through allowing some resistance, first of all, more seriously embattled 
resistances are prevented. Secondly, like Durkheim’s anomalies that remind individuals 
of the importance of collective conscience and therefore fortify it, resistance reinforces 
the power and its relations. Thus, power already includes its resistance and resistance is 
already one of the most natural elements of power. Consider the example offered by 
Brown (2000:50), 
 
 Just as a six per cent unemployment rate is necessary for the smooth 
functioning of capitalism, every power carries within it at least one 
resistance. And many of these resistances actually end up supporting the 
power by, for instance, making power appear less brutal than it is, or 
making power seem overwhelming, omnipresent, and therefore 
irresistible. So long as those of oppressed by the relations of power 
believe themselves to have certain inalienable rights, they are not as likely 
to think seriously about possible strategies for the overthrow of power 
relations. 
 
In addition, the quality of resistance is also determining. What kind of resistance are we 
talking about? Or, to what does resistance resist? Actually, the answer can be found 
through Walzer’s example of prison revolts. According to him, (1986) the discourse of 
prisoners takes a very different form. They do not question the separation between guilt 
and innocence. Or they do not resist to this historical categorization, which labeled 
them as criminals and which in turn put them into the prison. Instead, they complain 
about and resist to the inhumanity of the prison conditions such as punishments, 
harassments, torture, favoritism and so forth. (Walzer, 1986:65)  
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1.3 DISCOURSE AND STANDARDS OF NORMALITY 
 
 
In fact, to grasp all of the ideas that I have outlined thus far in a deeper sense, one 
should also look to the relation between power and discourse.  Because, first of all, the 
answer of how power produces knowledge lies under the discourse. Also, as Brown 
(2000:31) notes “…discourses are the arenas for studying power relations.” More 
comprehensively said, discourses are the arenas by which the net between power and 
knowledge, between power and truth, between truth and normalization of the 
population come to surface. Therefore, scrutinizing these nets may help us to 
understand what discourse is and how discourse works for Foucault. First of all, 
Foucault contends that (1980:93), 
 
[I]n a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold 
relations of power which permeate, characterize, and constitute the 
social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be 
established, consolidated nor implemented without the production 
accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse 
 
Consequently, there is a vital relation between power and discourse that leads them to 
complete each other. Actually, in this complementary relation, as has been cited before; 
discourse provides power the necessary grounds to produce knowledge. Because 
discourses, that are created by the regimes of truths, are the paths for production of 
knowledge. Discourses represent general definitions. And knowledge is produced by 
and in accordance to these general definitions. Therefore, knowledge itself is already a 
discursive consequent. It is a discursive formation and disposition. Discourse is a 
political anatomy and a political technology (McHaul and Grace, 1995; 60).    
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 For Foucault (1972:183), “…knowledge is defined by the possibilities of use and 
appropriation offered by discourse”. By that he means that, like power and knowledge, 
discourse and knowledge are also in a mutually functioning relation. There are no bodies 
of knowledge that are free from discursive practices. Similarly, discursive practices are 
not free from the knowledge that may define the discursive practices itself. 
Consequently, discourse is an indispensable element if we are to understand the role of 
power in producing knowledge (Lemert and Gilan, 1982; 57).  
 
We have said that discourses represent general definitions. General definitions define 
what one particular thing is or what it is not and what one particular thing excludes or 
includes. Let’s take the general definition of healthiness as an instance. The general 
definition of healthiness tells us who the healthy and the unhealthy is and what 
healthiness excludes - to have higher or lower levels of cholesterol than the cholesterol 
level defined as normal or to have lower or higher levels of erythrocyte than the level of 
it defined as normal. Similarly, it tells us what healthiness includes - the correlation 
between longevity and weight.  
 
This general definition of healthiness is represented in and by the medical discourse. 
Thus, in the medical discourse, through these general definitions and in reference with 
them, one is defined as healthy and the other as unhealthy. We can give several similar 
examples from different discourses such as sexuality, criminality and madness. In the 
discourse of criminality, through the general definition of criminality, crime is 
represented in a particular way. This definition of crime is neither haphazard nor 
amorphous.  It depends on the general definition of the crime.  
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In that case discourses have wide-ranging and penetrating affects on society and on 
individual subject. For example, by transforming madness into a medical discourse, the 
reforms made by Tuke and Pinel affected and radically changed the perception of 
madness by the masses and by the scientific community. They not only put an end to 
confinement through separating the mad from other socially unfits (the criminal, the 
vagabond, the poor), but also they changed the perception of madness by considering it 
as a psychiatric illness. In fact, the liberation of the mad from his chains was both a 
cause and a result of the medicalisation of madness. It meant that, a medical discourse 
on madness was created and what can be thought, what can be perceived, about 
madness was shaped by this discourse.     
 
In fact it should be noted that general definitions may both affect and be affected by 
several different discourses. The presence of a simple and isolated discourse is only 
theoretically possible. Theoretically, we can separate discourses and we can name them 
as, say, medical discourse or prisoner discourse. However, when we look to social 
formation level, we are confronted with a complex net of discourses that are interrelated 
and intersected.  
 
For instance, homosexuality may be defined as a sexual illness in the medical discourse 
and as a psychological problem, lets say related with childhood sexual abuse, in the 
psychiatric discourse. It may also be defined, in the discourse of sexuality, as a deviation 
of sexual preference that is not directed to reproduction in the discourse of sexuality. In 
such a situation it is more difficult to decide why and how homosexuality is defined, in 
this or that way, as an illness. Is it because the findings of medical discourse or 
psychiatric discourse or the discourse of sexuality? 
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In that case, discourses are not only indispensable elements of power during the 
production of knowledge but they are also the boundary lines representing the general 
definitions which in turn determine the way things work. Foucault revealed this 
(1980:94) more frankly when he says that,  
 
In the end, we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our 
undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function 
of the true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of 
power. 
 
Hence, discourses function so as to produce a particular kind of human subject that can 
write, speak, think and act in the boundary lines of discourses in accordance with certain 
specific ways allowed by discourses. Therefore, as Lemert and Gilan (1982:31) point out 
“…a discourse would then be whatever constrains-but also enables- writing, speaking 
and thinking within such specific historical limits.”      
 
As a consequence, then the discursive formation is not just a surface on which general 
definitions are represented. It also produces certain material relations among individuals, 
beliefs, practices and objects. In addition to this, it produces certain material effects on 
the bodies of the individual. For example, Brown (2000:69) has noted that, “…the 
process of hysterization of the female body…refers to the inscription of material effects 
on the body by a series of moral and medical discourses and clinical practices.”  
 
Thus far, it can be seen that discourse transmits the effects of power and it is inevitable 
for Foucault’s retheorization of power. Nevertheless, it must be noted that for Foucault 
discourse is not the only factor at work here. It is true that discourse is a framework 
within which general definitions are represented and individual subjects are shaped. 
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Foucault does not develop a new theory or a new semiology of discourse. Rather it is 
just a starting point. (Mchaul-Grace, 1995:62) 
 
With that caveat in mind, we can continue with out inquiry into what shapes and forms 
discourses. Indeed it is the truth itself that is defined by Foucault (1980:133) “…as a 
system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation 
and operation of statements.” From Foucault’s perspective truth is produced by power 
and this production is necessary for power to exercise itself. Put differently, according 
to Foucault (1980:93), “…power never ceases its interrogation of truth: it 
institutionalizes, professionalises and rewards its pursuit” Thus, there is no truth waiting 
outside to be captured, instead, it is created and sustained by power and in turn truth 
intensifies and extends effects of power. This in fact corresponds to what Foucault calls 
the regime of truth (1980:131).   
 
[E]ach society has its own regime of truth, its general politics of truth: 
that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; 
the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and 
false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques 
and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth. 
 
In such a situation, it becomes obvious that, whereas discourses determine and serve as 
boundary lines for the decision and definition of what can be thought and what can be 
said, truth determines what can or cannot be the true discourse and what is or is not 
accepted as true discourse. If, truth as the producer of the true discourse and the 
discourse as the representors of general definitions are considered together, the most 
striking point about discourse is revealed. It is the fact that discourses either accept or 
reject. That’s why Foucault does not label language as a discourse since language neither 
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denies nor approves. For that reason, Foucault perceives discourse as a political 
commodity.  He notes that (1980:245), 
 
Discourses not only exhibit immanent principles of regularity, they are 
also bound by regulations enforced through social practices of 
appropriation, control and policing. Discourse is a political commodity. 
 
Then as a political commodity, discourse either accepts or denies through general 
definitions it represents. These general definitions usher in normality standards that are 
the standards of being normal, thinking normally, speaking normally, etc. Normal is 
everything or anything that is represented as normal by and within the discourse. Put 
differently, normal is the thing that is accepted, approved and included by and within 
the discourse. On the other hand, if one particular thing is rejected, denied or excluded 
then it is abnormal. Henceforth, we hold in our hands a structure that represents the 
definition of the populace according to what is normal and what is not. Therefore, 
discourses represent what is excluded (as revealed by the ship of fools), what is confined 
(as revealed by the great confinement of 17th century), what is to be praised  (as revealed 
either by sanity or by heterosexuality), what is to be disparaged (as revealed either by 
insanity or homosexuality). Henceforth, briefly, discourse is the representor of 
restriction and revilement, rejection and approval. As a natural outcome, then, discourse 
is not a simple tool through which power creates knowledge; it also is the arena for 
formation of individual subject. In other words, the individual subject is the subject of 
the discourse and it is ceaselessly constructed and reconstructed in the discourse. That is 
why Foucault’s work can help us to perceive the constitutions of individual subject in 
different discourses by various ways. However, it must immediately be noted that 
discourse is not a remote controller. The reason is that both discourses and individuals 
are elements that are in continuous constitution. They are not completed and mature. 
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Henceforth, discourses are not completed clothes cloaked on the individual subject. But 
the individual subject is formed in and by discourses in an ongoing and ceaseless 
process. 
 
In addition to this, discourse, as a representor is not enough to separate, to label, to 
judge and to value the populace. At this very point, one other vital specialty of power 
enters into scene: disciplinary power.  
 
1.4 DISCIPLINE 
 
 
From Foucault’s perspective, in fact, there may be found two different but related 
senses of discipline: discipline either as the social control and social practices or 
discipline as referring to bodies of knowledge such as science, medicine, psychiatry, 
sociology and so on. In the former sense, discipline also links with to institutions of 
social control such as the asylum, the hospital, the school, the factory, the confessional 
and so forth. According to Foucault (1977), discipline, in the sense of social control and 
practices, is the painstaking control of the operation of the body. It produces docile and 
practiced bodies. It means that discipline makes individuals who are both the targets and 
instruments of it. These individuals are imposed a functional reduction of their bodies 
and skills and utilities. In other words, discipline is the political investment of the body. 
By Foucault’s words (1977:139), “…discipline is a political anatomy of detail.”  This 
political anatomy produces the obedient student in the classroom, the healthy 
individuals in the society and the skilled labor in the factory (Ransom, 1997:59).  
Accordingly, Walzer noted (1986:59) that,  
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The function of discipline is to create useful subjects, men and women 
who conform a standard, who are certifiably sane or healthy or docile or 
competent, not free agents who invent their own standards. 
 
Laconically, then, discourse and discipline show historically specific relations and they 
together create a double mode of control: discourses, as has been cited before, as 
representors and confirmators of general definitions or of a standard that define what 
and who are abnormal and normal. And discipline and disciplinary power produces and 
separates individuals and skills in references to these standards. This means that 
discipline as a separator creates a hierarchy the good and the bad subjects and behaviors.   
As Foucault puts it (1977:199): 
 
Generally speaking, all the authorities exercising individual control 
function according to a double mode; that of binary division and 
branding (mad-sane, dangerous-harmless, normal-abnormal); and that of 
coercive assignment, of differential distribution (who he is, where he 
must be; how he is to be characterized; how he is to be recognized; how 
constant surveillance is to be exercised over him in an individual way.  
 
Production, distribution and assignment of skills, the skills of social behavior, the skills 
of being a good student, the skills of being healthy, the skills of being sane, are done in 
regards with normality standards. And the ones that do not fit these standards are 
labeled as abnormal.  
 
Indeed, between production and segregation of individuals and skills there exists a vital 
tool: measurement. Measurement is one of the distinctive specialties of modern 
disciplinary power. Succinctly, the separation between individuals is made possible by 
applying of the techniques of measuring which in turn leads to correction, and 
supervision. Because measurement obtains the apt paths to evaluate the level up to 
where expected and wanted skills are created. One of these paths can be considered as 
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examination in the instance of the school as a disciplinary institution. Examination is a 
kind of measurement that measures the good and the bad student and thus reveals 
disciplined and undisciplined students with disciplined or undisciplined skills. One other 
important fact comes to surface at this point, which is that the measurement is 
accompanied with the supervision. It is the measurement that provides the necessary 
grounds for the separation of the good and the bad, the normal and the abnormal. 
However, disciplinary power does not stop here. After this segregation another 
technique enters into scene: correction. Concisely, the good behavior and skills are 
awarded whereas the bad behavior and skills are punished. For example, a good student 
is graded with an “A” as a result of his good skills. On the other hand, a criminal as a 
result of her criminal attitudes is put into the jail. However, prisons are not only places 
for the punishment but also are the places for correction. Henceforth, punishment, 
here, colludes with a different concept: correction. The correction process is one of the 
most apt indicators of the complexity and productivity of modern disciplinary power. 
Through correction power not only produces but also reproduces. The path to obtain 
the perfect society is not simple a matter of exiling social misfits. It can be asserted that 
the aim of the power is not to isolate its subjects but to gain and regain them. In fact, 
the social misfit/abnormal always has a potential chance to rejoin the family of the 
normal. Therefore, power exercises a continuous correction that is accompanied by 
mechanisms of supervision. The family of unfortunates is formed by separation, 
categorization and distribution, measurement, correction and supervision. 
 
Supervising constitutes ceaseless judgment. For Foucault the modern society is the 
society of judgment. As has been cited before, power is to control and control is the 
social control. The main function of the social control is to constitute the normal 
individual.  At any point of this constitution process, there exist the judges of the 
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society. They are trained and certified. They assure the functioning of distribution, 
segregation, measurement, correction and supervision. They have the right to decide 
whether or not an individual is deviated from the social norms as well as to examine and 
to test him. The results of their tests and examinations may correspond to authoritative 
statements. They make authoritative statements about health, about sex, about family, 
about the genetic make-up, and so on. In a sense they are the strategic points by which 
the general definitions and normality standards are concretely applied.  
 
Actually, the facts that have been argued thus far make Foucault’s understanding of 
power unique. This unique type of power is discursive and disciplinary. It defines, 
segregates, classifies, measures, corrects, and quantifies, judges and labels. Therefore, it 
normalizes and it is normalizing. In accordance with this new power, the new society, 
modern society, is the disciplined and the normalized society.  And it is this disciplined 
society, which attracts Foucault most.  
 
That is why Foucault has paid much more attention to the plague than he did to the 
leper since the political dream of the leper was separation in terms of isolation and exile. 
On the other hand, the plague was at the center of a more systematic concern. And this 
concern was the disciplined society. Hence, Foucault does is not concern with the 
simple logic of expel the one who ruins the order. For it is no longer the era of the ship of the 
fools.  Instead there exist several disciplinary institutions for the disciplinization and also 
correction of the abnormal as well as the normal.  
 
The very same situation perfectly matches genetic science and its historical practices. In 
times of radical eugenism to protect the order of the gene pool, psychiatric patients and 
Jews, for instance, were killed in the name of the Nazi ideology.  And that was the 
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simple logic. However, beginning with the 1950s and 60s, through genetic counseling 
and fertility studies, the idea of rehabilitation of the misfit became the main concern. 
Genocide was replaced with gene engineering and manipulation for the sake of a healthy 
society.  
 
Aptly summarized, from Foucault’s perspective the regime of truth decides and 
produces the true discourse. True discourses represent the normality standards that 
define the line between normal and the abnormal. This definition is put into concrete 
application by disciplinary power, policies of which are segregation, measurement, 
correction and supervision, through normalization. The main function of the 
disciplinary power is to discipline the body and the population. And as Brown noted 
(2000:103) “…disciplinary power converts itself into an insidious, normalizing regime of 
truth.” In other words to discipline is to normalize. Thus, normalization is the historical 
outcome of the disciplinary power and the disciplined society. It is the administration 
and structuring of the life not with repression but with the norm and the normalization. 
As Hoy put it (1981:43-63), the process of normalization “…is the increasing 
rationalization, organization, and homogenization of society in modern times.” 
However, the most important point about normalization is that it is not a negative task 
since it is not constituted by law. Besides, it refers neither to tradition nor to ritual. 
Instead, it refers to the norm, which is a standard and a particular mode of behavior that 
should be reached.   
 
One other fundamental point is the creation and constitution of the modern individual 
by normalization. As Taylor (1986:75) explains, “…the being who is thus examined, 
measured, categorized, made the target of policies of normalization, is the one whom we 
have come to define as the modern individual.” Therefore, normalization is the essence 
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of disciplinary power. Accordingly, normalization is one of the defining elements of 
modern power: what is wielded through the modern technologies of control is 
something quite different, in that it is not concerned with law but with normalization 
(Taylor, 1986:75).  
 
1.5 SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
So based on this explanatory account, it can be said that the modern social life is the 
arena of disciplines. Up to now, the social control and correction aspects of this arena 
are argued. However, this arena also has an aspect, as has been cited before, which is 
either the branches or bodies of knowledge.  In fact, these two aspects are in a 
complementary and interrelated relation. As noted by Lucas (1992:137), “…discipline 
implies the rapid development of a new area of knowledge: the human mind and how to 
act upon it. In sum, it leads to the fashioning of individual to fit a norm.” So, it is to say 
that, disciplinary power needs disciplinary knowledge and there could be no exercise of 
discipline without the disciplinary knowledge (Walzer, 1986:64) In a word, discipline as 
social control implies the emergence of discipline as bodies of knowledge. 
 
At this point we receive the second aspect of discipline, which is human sciences since 
they are the disciplines in which knowledges are collected. According to Foucault, 
(1980:239)“…the modern human sciences must be understood in relation to elaboration 
of a whole range of techniques and practices for the discipline, surveillance, 
administration and formation of populations of human individuals” So, human sciences 
have a mission that is to provide, concisely, the necessary techniques and practices for 
the possible exercise of disciplinary power. To do this, the modern human sciences 
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construct and also accumulate a field or a body of knowledge. Due to this mission of 
the modern human sciences, disciplinary power is extracted from being a simple world 
of law, of right, of legal principles and of repression. It becomes the world of normality 
of which principles are determined by the human sciences through the usage and 
construction of knowledges. Comprehensively said, normality standards that provide the 
framework for normality are set into play by scientific forms of knowledge. In other 
words as Ransom explains (1997:48) “…what counts as natural and thus normal 
depends on the kinds of things the sciences decide to measure” And in the modern 
society the behavior of the individual subject is regulated by these standards.     
 
For those reasons, Foucault pays great attention to the analysis of scientific knowledge. 
It may be concluded from this analysis that sciences are the truth games in which the 
truth or the reality is created.   As another dimension, these analyses help us to 
understand how the truth or reality is created. Put differently, it helps us to see the 
relation between normalization and the human sciences in a striking manner. What is 
defined, as standards of normality are set into play in regards with what is defined as the 
truth. And truth in modern societies is produced, shaped and determined by the modern 
human sciences through the production, accumulation and application of scientific 
knowledge by several techniques, measurements and observations. After all, normality 
standards as the application of scientific knowledge gain the privilege of being real and 
corresponding to the truth. And the individual and his social behavior is shaped in these 
created truth games. In order to be normal he has to redeem the standards of normality. 
For example, standards of the healthy life, that are achieved through the scientific 
knowledge, are defined as the accuracy of height and weight, regular daily exercise, 
nourishment primarily depending on proteins, carbohydrates, fats, vitamins, minerals 
such as calcium, and so forth.  If the individual subject does not have proper social-
 25 
economic and cultural conditions to fulfill these rules of being healthy, and therefore 
cannot apply these rules in his life, then he is not healthy. When he goes to doctor and 
has a check up, his unhealthy life style comes to surface and he, repeatedly, is advised to 
fulfill these rules. First of all, here, individual subject is measured by a reference to 
already defined standards. And then he is evaluated in regards with the accuracy of his 
reality and the reality of normality standards. In cases that there is a misfit between these 
two realities, rules become a torture to the individual. It is a fact that there may be 
individuals that do not care with these rules and who do not fulfill these standards. 
Nonetheless, they are still under the categorization of the normality. They are abnormal 
or unhealthy in the eyes of medical science and politico-medical discourse.  
 
It must also be noted, I contend, that the truth and therefore rules of being healthy or 
being normal are unbalanced. They are openly debatable as a result of two things, one of 
which is the expansion of scientific knowledge and other of which is the overlap of 
different discourses.  I would argue that these two things lead to crucial confusions in 
the production of the reality and the truth. 
 
First of all, it is an obvious fact that science advances day by day. These advances may 
lead the expansion and changing of scientific knowledge and therefore the truths.  
These advances, for example, may change the rules of being healthy.  We should 
remember that the debate on treating women with iron preparations. It had been 
assumed that giving additional iron to women was a necessity as a result of their iron 
loss especially during menstruation and pregnancy. However, now the very object of it is 
supported. Worse, it is argued that iron preparations cause mammary cancers.  In such a 
case we witness the expansion of the scientific knowledge. Consequently, in this 
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situation, the truth and the rule defined by medical science changes and therefore the 
determination of the healthy life of the women, as well.      
 
 Secondly, scientific knowledge may not always be the pure element of scientific 
process. For example, in the past, as one of the rules of being healthy, doctors advised 
people to use flower seed oil instead of olive oil. On the other hand, today’s medical 
science advises people to use olive oil for a lot of reasons. It was understood that the 
insistence on flower seeds oil was the result of stocks of seed oil of companies. This 
example shows us that the truth and the normality standards may depend on complex 
relations of different discourses.  
 
These two things indicate that the reality stands on a slippery surface. Reality and truth 
are again and again recreated. At the end the standards and realities turn into torments. 
But it is still the modern sciences such as clinical medicine, criminology, statistics, 
biology and modern psychiatry that structure the control of the person in modern 
societies.  Therefore, it is not any more the singular state who controls but instead it is 
the pluralistic mechanisms of the modern society of which authority derive from their 
relation with scientific truths.  Walzer put this as follows (1986:54), “…when the king’s 
head was cut off, the theory of state died too; it was replaced by sociology, psychology, 
criminology, and so on.”   
 
This relation between science and power results in a specific formulation. It is to know is 
to control and to know is also one sort of control by itself. This formulation has two important 
aspects. First of all, as has been argued before, if power is to socially control, and if it is 
the knowledge that makes the exercise of power possible then knowledge also is the 
necessary ground for control. And if it is human sciences, which create, constitute and 
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accumulate knowledge then these sciences are also the ways of control. Thus, the 
human sciences are one of the channels that power takes form. In other words, in 
Foucault’s hands the sanctified and privileged position of the human sciences is turned 
upside down. He ascertains their realities taken for granted, and he reveals their 
underground reality. This underground reality is that the human sciences are 
administrative mechanisms that have the authority of creating knowledge. These 
mechanisms are the efficient management of the population and the individual.    
 
Indeed, the differences between the episteme of modern era and others may primarily 
depend on this reality. According to Gutting (1989) in the Renaissance era the episteme 
had the specialty of resemblance. In the classical era it was representation. However, in 
the modern era it was organically stratified. Foucault (1972) claims that the 
representation of the episteme means the homogeneity of the knowledge. Each domain 
of knowledge was a particular form of the general science. However, in modern era 
there was a decline in this representative approach. Representation was replaced by the 
fragmentation of the bodies of knowledge. In other words, in the modern era, the 
domains of knowledge were separated from each other. I would argue that this 
distinction intensified the concentration on knowledge and the authority of each distinct 
domain. As a result, knowledge, the human sciences and the ability to know became a 
mode of power and a mode of control.  
 
The second aspect of this formulation may create a topic of lively debate.  As it has 
been mentioned in the first dimension, science produces knowledge and knowledge 
provides the necessary grounds for control. Then, the main bridge between science and 
modern power and the modern society is the knowledge itself. I would argue that by 
studying the historical experiences Foucault tries to reveal the constitution and 
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establishment of this bridge. For instance, while studying madness, his main aim was not 
to reveal what was mad and how. Instead, through asylum, he showed us the 
accumulation and constitution of a field of knowledge on madness that made the 
control based on irrationality possible.  
 
I would also argue that only after the constitution of this bridge the control and exercise 
of power on subjects and on population in modern terms become possible. In other 
words, the modern type of power depends on the production and accumulation of 
knowledge. Knowledge is the golden key. However, it must immediately be noted that 
sciences are just one of the paths that produces knowledge. There are also some other 
mechanisms that accumulate knowledge. These are panopticonal institutions such as the 
school, the factory, the army, the hospital and the confessional.  For instance, the 
confessional recorded high ratios of information about the sexual secrets.  Then these 
were published. These published records constituted and accumulated knowledge on the 
body and on the sexuality that intensifies the control on sexuality.   
 
When these two dimensions join together it becomes possible to understand that 
genetic science is a new bridge between power-control and society. It produces and 
gathers knowledge on the population and on the individual.  That is why it should be 
interpreted in Foucaultian terms.  In the end, it is the production of knowledge that lies 
in the heart of the modern power and control.  This knowledge is constituted in the true 
discourses either by the scholarly disciplines that are the human sciences or by the 
panopticonal institutions such as the confessional.  
 
Thus, the invisible reality of the human sciences is that they are the professionalized 
apparatuses of power. All of them concentrate on distinct domains each of which 
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corresponds to one part of the population and the individual. In these distinct domains 
they produce, gather and accumulate knowledge. Biology and its domain of knowledge 
correspond to the biological domain of men and it governs the biological features of 
men through producing and gathering biological knowledge. Like biology and other 
modern sciences, genetics is also the domain of the genetic make-up and it governs the 
DNA and its combinations through producing and gathering genetic knowledge. At this 
point, it becomes obvious that the invisible reality of knowledge is that it is a regulated 
knowledge directed towards the control and reproduction of the human bodies.  
 
1.6 THE POLICE AND THE PASTORSHIP      
 
 
In fact to make this idea, namely science and knowledge as vehicles of power, more 
intelligible we should investigate two concepts: police and pastorship. These two concepts 
are explanatory because they explicitly reveal the emergence of a sort of power, which is 
based on knowledge and the modern human sciences: the knowledge-power and the 
perception of population as an economic and political problem, and in accordance with 
this, the emergence of new aims of the knowledge-power.  
 
This knowledge-power certainly is a new type since according to Foucault (see for 
example Foucault, 1981 and Foucault, 1988), up to 17th and 18th c.c.s, there had been a 
power organized around the sovereign and sovereignty. It was an ineffective and an 
impractical government that had two ultimate functions: war and peace (Foucault, 
1980:170). In the framework of these two functions the ultimate mastery was on death 
and on threat of death. However, for Foucault (see, Foucault, 1981: 223-254) by 17th 
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and 18th c.c.s this sovereign power transformed into the pastoral power which becomes 
a regulating technology and a governmental apparatus in the modern society.  
 
It exceeds any understanding of power as a simple state apparatus (McNay, 1994:120) 
and it is not the sovereign, and therefore not totalizing, but rather individualizing power. 
For that reason he said (1981:227) “ If the state is the political form of a centralized and 
centralizing power, let us call pastorship the individualizing power.” It is individualizing 
for it means for him (1981:227)“…the development of techniques oriented towards 
individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and permanent way.”  
 
 This individualizing power, which is the new regulating technology, was no longer 
simply concerned with the mastery of death. In contrast its level of mastery was the 
body and the life itself. It was concerned with the management of the lives of 
individuals. Its role was to constantly ensure, sustain and improve the lives of everyone. 
(Foucault, 1981: 235). Thus, there occurred a new sphere through which power could 
intervene: life and its management, instead of death and its fatality. This replacement of 
mastery of death with the management of life resulted in the new perception of 
population. The population of the individuals was not any more the sum of legal 
subjects but it was a literally living problem. And the individuals were not anymore 
subjects with juridical status, but instead they were working, sleeping, thinking, speaking, 
writing, reproducing and living beings. In other words, the perception of population as a 
living problem means that it is not anymore a simple and single totality that can be 
controlled by any simple and single power apparatus depending on sovereignty and 
repression. Instead it is, after all, a multiplied thing that has several different economic 
and political features and/or variables such as diet, fertility studies, longevity of life and 
health, etc.  
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One consequence of the discovery of population as a multiplied unit is the shift of the 
aim of power from the control of the totality to the manipulation of these variables in 
their relations to things. The emergence of these variables of the population through 
creating new domains to be administered, optimized, and managed increased the 
intervention of state on the population and the human body. A more comprehensive 
and multiple technique of government could only manage this increased intervention. 
This new multiple technique in the 18th c.c. was the police itself.  
 
According to Foucault (1981), in 17th and 18th c.c.s the police was not understood in 
terms of institutions. Instead, he said, (1980:170) “…police is the ensemble of 
mechanisms serving to ensure order, the properly channeled growth of wealth and the 
conditions of preservation of health in general.” In other words the main concern of the 
police was to take care of men as a population. In a word, what the police see to is alive, 
active and productive man (Foucault, 1988:155-156). For that reason Foucault 
contended that (1981:250), 
 
The police deal with religion, not, of course, from the point of the 
dogmatic truth, but from that of the moral quality of life. In seeing to 
health and supplies, it deals with the preservation of life; concerning 
trade, factories, workers, the poor and public order, it deals with the 
conveniences of life. In seeing to the theatre, literature entertainment, its 
object is life’s pleasures. In short, life is the object of the police. 
 
In a word, the object of the police is the manipulation of the relevant variables of the 
population. The urgent question here is that where this capability of the police does 
come from? The answer is that it does not depend on repression and sovereignty but 
depends on gathering and storing of knowledge. That is why Ransom notes (1997:62) 
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that, “…various kinds of knowledge about the population must be gathered to 
determine the most efficient ways to manipulate the relevant variables.” 
 
Briefly then the police are the main technique that enables the presence of knowledge-
power by gathering and accumulating knowledge. It provides the specific, concrete, 
regularized and measured knowledge that is necessary to control the multiplied 
population.  
 
In fact, at this very point, the relation between the modern human sciences and the 
modern power becomes apparent for today it is these sciences that serve as the police 
technique of power. Today what takes charge of lives of individuals are not anymore the 
police, but the human sciences the origin of which is the police. Actually, Foucault 
noted this affinity between the police and human sciences clearly and when he noted 
that (Foucault, 1988:162)  
 
[I]f man, - if we, as living, speaking, working beings - became an object 
for several different sciences, the reason has to be sought not in ideology 
but in the existence of this political technology which we have formed in 
our own societies. 
 
As a result, according to Foucault the emergence of the modern human sciences has 
been the necessary and natural outcome of the new perception of population as an 
‘alive’ problem and the new governing political technology of this alive problem For 
that reason he said that, (1988:161) “…the new perception of population and relevantly 
the increased concern of the state on the lives of individuals developed the necessary 
grounds and fields for new social and human sciences.”   In accordance with this, 
Ransom also points out that (1997:64),  
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[P]astoral power continues to concern itself with the health and physic 
states of the individual in this world. Thus psychologists and psychiatrics, 
as well as others with a less professional facade, diagnose and attempt to 
address the miseries of modern life. At the same time, social workers and 
state agencies do their best to shape their programs in a way that will 
promote the health and even the happiness of individuals they come into 
contact with. Often they find themselves using the methods-or at least 
adopting the assumptions- associated with psychology.    
 
As a consequence of all of these points, the affinity of genetic science with the 
Foucaultian context becomes clearer. Despite the fact that all other human sciences 
implicitly include the idea of police, genetic science explicitly represent this police 
quality. Because, this science without any hesitation declares that its aim is to gather and 
to accumulate information about the gene stock of the men which sometimes is said to 
be used for the sake of the gene pool and population genetics and which sometimes is 
said to be used for the sake of micro eugenic practices. In a word, this study argues that 
genetic technology is a police power. 
 
At this point, it should be remembered that what draws the argument up to towards 
police and pastoral power are the concepts of discipline, disciplinary society and 
disciplinary power.  As has been already argued, discipline has two meanings for 
Foucault: discipline as bodies of knowledge, the modern human sciences and the 
discipline as regulation, normalization and thus disciplinization of bodies. The latter, 
disciplinization, needs the former, the sciences, because in order to discipline the 
population, the population must be known. Put differently, the disciplinization of the 
population is maintained through the vehicle of the police. Then, as a natural 
consequence, the disciplinary society is also the police society in which knowledge is the 
main object and to know is the main predicate. 
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1.7 GAZE-POWER AND PANOPTICON  
 
 
Nonetheless, within this disciplinary and police society, the individual subject is not only 
exposed to knowledge-power of which the mainstay is to know. But he also is subjected 
to one other thing which in turn makes him to be known. It is the power of the gaze. 
Put differently the individual subject is not only known but he also is observed. Thus, 
the disciplinary power is the observing power and the observation is a new power 
technique and a new way of making docile bodies. It is these constantly observed docile 
bodies and the new way of making them docile that Foucault mostly refers to in 
Discipline and Punishment (1977). 
 
 In such a discourse, gaze-power, the consequence is not only the docile body but also 
the painstaking control of the lives of the participants, which cannot be understood in 
terms of sovereignty but rather in terms of surveillance. In other words, the control 
maintained through the gaze cannot anymore be obtained by the formula of monarchial 
power and the repression but instead it is obtained through the power of a perfect eye, 
the panopticon. 
 
Panopticon is a simple architectural design but a complex technology of power invented 
by Bentham to solve the problems of surveillance (Foucault, 1980:148) As an 
architectural design, panopticon is comprised of a central tower, which sees everything 
without ever being seen and a peripheric ring which is totally seen without seeing. 
(Foucault, 1977: 200)  In a word, the main principle of this design is that the inmate 
knows that he is always being looked but he never knows when he is being looked.   
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Thus, Foucault said that, it is “…a perfect eye that nothing would escape and a centre 
towards which all gazes would be turned.”(Foucault, 1977:173)     
 
On the other hand, the panopticon in terms of being a new technology is 
much more than a simple physical constraint. As a power technique the 
implications of the panopticon exceeds the regular distribution of the 
body in spaces.  
 
 
 In the social formation level, as a power technology, the panoptic schema, as McNay 
(1994:94) puts it,   
 
[M]akes any apparatus of power more intense: …it assures its efficacy by 
its preventative character, its continuous functioning and its automatic 
mechanisms…it is a way of making power relations function, and of 
making a function through these power relations. 
  
Consequently, the panopticon must be understood as a general mode of power. And a 
society, in which power relations are defined by this general mode, must be understood 
as a vast panopticon. Similar to Bentham’s architectural design, in this social design of 
the panopticon, there is a central tower and a peripheric ring. This peripheric ring may 
be comprised of patients, prisoners, schoolchildren, the insane, the worker, the idle, and 
the beggar. The central tower, on the other hand, may be the workshop, the school, the 
army, the hospital and the prison. The gaze of panopticon sometimes reforms, 
sometimes treats, sometimes instructs, sometimes confines and sometimes supervises.  
At this very point, I would argue that whatever the look does, whoever looks and 
whoever is looked is not important. The ultimate point here is that in any case the 
panopticon produces the homogenous effects of power. That is why, for Foucault, 
power cannot be reduced to state or the dominant class. What is important here neither 
is the observer and the observed nor the way of observation, but the observation itself. 
Foucault puts this the following way (1977: 202): 
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It [panopticon] is an important machine, for it automatizes and 
disindividualizes power. Power has its principle not so much in a person 
as in certain concerted distribution of the bodies, surfaces, lights, gaze; in 
an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in 
which individuals caught up…There is a machinery that assures 
dyssymetry, disequiblirium, difference…The panopticon is marvelous 
machine which, whatever use one may wish to put it to, produces 
homogeneous effects of power.  
 
As a result, by a simple idea in architecture, a new political anatomy is acquired which 
alters, internally corrects and transforms the behavior and the individual subject through 
the power of the gaze.  
 
One other striking point that completes the idea of panopticon, is the location of the 
gaze. In the architectural design, the gaze is located in the central tower. However, in the 
social design the gaze cannot be understood as something located in the very center of 
an encompassing web. Instead, it can be found in different confines of the hospital, 
school, army, asylum and the work-shop, family, clinic and so on. These are the sites in 
which the gaze, the normalization, the segregation and disciplinization are put into 
concrete applications. Put differently, in these sites power is practically and physically 
practiced, it is resisted or obeyed. For that reason Walzer argued that (1986:58), 
 
We can’t understand contemporary society…unless we look hard and 
close at this kind of power and these people: not state or class or 
corporate power, not the proletriate or the people or the toiling masses, 
but hospitals, asylums, prisons, armies, schools, factories, and patients, 
madmen, criminals, conscripts, children, factory hands.  
 
In fact, these sites by themselves display panopticonal features since they are not only 
the application points of power and its techniques but also they are institutions that 
serve as the physical places for observation. For instance, the hospital is the physical 
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place in which the illness is not only treated but also observed. Similarly, the prison is 
the physical place in which the crime is not only corrected but also observed.  
 
The point that I would like to emphasize here is the fact that these sites constitute the 
means by which Foucault grasps and understands the underground reality of modern 
power. As Gutting stated (1981: 226):  
 
It may be wise not to take as a whole the rationalization of society or of 
culture, but to analyze this process in several fields; each of them 
grounded in a fundamental experience: madness, illness, crime, sexuality, 
etc.  
 
By studying these fields he reaches different experiences and through these experiences, 
he gets into depths of the power wielded in the institutions that deals with the control 
of the individual subject and the constitution of the self. For that reason, what he makes 
is not a simple historical analysis that explores the historical development of different 
experiences and institutions corresponding to them. Instead while Foucault magnifies 
institutions and experiences, the essential worry for him is to grasp the truth and its 
relation with self, the power and its relations with self and self’s relations with itself.   
 
1.8 SELF 
 
 
In the first form, the self is displayed as the subject of knowledge, in the second form, 
self is displayed as subject of power and in the third form self is displayed as subject of 
ethical techniques. For instance, in Birth of The Clinic his analysis focuses on the 
constitution the self as subject of knowledge. In Discipline and Punishment, he analyzes 
the subject in relation with a field of power. Finally, in The History of Sexuality he 
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analyses the subject as a moral agent who constitutes itself through some ethical 
techniques of the self such as self-deciphering. 
 
Actually, these three specific forms correspond to different domain of analysis 
respectively: archaeology, genealogy and ethics. Archaeology is an analysis of systems of 
knowledge. As McNay (1994:69) notes; “…it [archaeology] involves the analysis of 
heterogeneous elements: institutions, techniques, social groups, perceptual 
organizations. On the other hand, genealogy is the analysis of modalities of power. 
Genealogy is the analysis of power and its relations with the self whereas ethics is the 
specific form of analysis of the self’s relations with itself (Davidson, 1986:221).  Arnold 
Davidson notes that (1986:224), 
 
[A genealogy’s] central area of focus is the mutual relations between 
systems of truth and modalities of power, the way in which there is a 
political regime of the production of truth. Following Nietzche, 
Foucault’s pursuit of genealogy led him to be concerned with the origin 
of specific claims to truth, especially the claims, concepts, and truths of 
the human sciences.  
 
As a result, Foucault has a three-dimensional understanding: power, knowledge and self. 
And it can be said that Foucault constructs a counterbalance between the domination 
and the self. For him these two axes, that are both mutually exclusive and inclusive, 
must be included in an analysis attempting to fully understand the modern power and 
the modern subject. For that reason he is interested both in techniques of domination 
and techniques of self. Indeed, this understanding provides a way to grasp his view of 
self. The counterbalance between the self and the domination shows us that his view of 
self is never fully imposed. Similarly, his view of power is never fully imposing. In other 
words, power is not a mechanism that, simply, can or cannot control. Similarly, the self 
is not a simple individual who is fully controlled. It is not, either, a subject, fully out of 
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control, who discovers and invents itself in a huge web of resistances through going off 
the power’s orbit.  Instead, it is the individual subject who is both productive and 
subjected.  It is productive since its body forces are increased in terms of usefulness. It 
has a capacity enabling him to conduct several numbers of operations on its own body 
and soul. On the other hand, it is subjected since the power that may result from his 
body forces is diminished in political terms of obedience. (Brown, 2000:50)  Thus, it is 
not the capacity of invention and discovery but re-invention.  According to McNay, 
Foucault put this as follows (1994:146), 
 
I am interested…in the way in which the subject constitutes himself in 
an active fashion, by the practices of the self, these practices are 
nevertheless not something that the individual invents by himself. They 
are patterns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, 
suggested and imposed on him by culture, his society and his social 
group. 
 
This means that there is no pure subject. Instead there are descriptions and labels, 
briefly, nations of identity that are culturally determined. Ian Hacking (1986:36) put this 
as follows,  
 
Liberationists urge that the category of homosexual (and hence 
heterosexual) did not exists until the doctors of deviancy invented it. 
There were acts, but not a homosexual kind of person. It is a Foucaultian 
thesis that every way in which I can think of myself as a person and an 
agent is something that has been constituted within a web of historical 
events.  
 
For that reason, the self is linked with the cultural text and the moral code.  More 
importantly, the Foucaultian self is not the liberated self. The modern individual subject 
is a deciphered and a deciphering subject. He self-deciphers and/or confesses his most 
sinful and most hidden secrets and deviations. This may force us to think that the 
modern individual subject is fully free to deviate and fully free to declare his deviation.  
However the reality is the other way around. The capability of declaration of deviancies 
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is not the liberation of the self but the reproduction of relations of power. For instance, 
when a homosexual confesses that he is homosexual he does not celebrate his deviancy. 
But, he internalizes both the power and its defined normalities and abnormalities. 
Thoroughly and thoroughly he reminds himself that he is deviated from the general 
standards of sexuality and thus there is something abnormal with him that has to be 
confessed. It is not the heterosexual that confesses his heterosexuality but he is the 
homosexual who confesses his homosexuality. This, indeed, takes us to another striking 
point.  The identity is not constituted solely by exclusion of others. It is not only 
reproduction of rationality and normality and heterosexuality. In a word, it is not only, 
“…we are sane because others are insane.” It also is the inclusion of the abnormal. It 
also is the reproduction of the irrationality, abnormality and homosexuality. In a word, it 
also is “I confess that I am insane.” 
 
Based on these explanations, it can easily be seen that Foucault tampers with several 
fundamental points regarding the constitution of the modern self, modern society and 
modern power. He analyzes different conceptualizations by using different forms of 
analysis. This is a necessary outcome of his understanding of society. Foucaultian society 
is not a unity comprised of gradual transformations and regular continuities. For him, 
neither the society nor the power and self are unified around a single center. Instead, 
what he shows through his studies on experiences are exclusion, rejection, elimination, 
segregation and discontinuity.  
 
From his perspective, what defines our society at first is the perception of the body and 
population as living problems that have relevant variables to be managed.  Secondly, it is 
the decentralization of the power and ramification of its apparatuses and channels in 
order to be capable of dealing with this alive social body. Thirdly, it is the making of 
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knowledge-power and of gaze-power agents of transformation of human life. In a word, 
the distinctive feature of the modern society is designation of biological needs, so called 
bio-power and its channels such as public health, sexual relations, diseases, genetic stock 
and criminology, clinical medicine, eugenics, sociology and gene technology. 
 
 Before finishing, it must be noted that, this chapter presents the general approach of 
Foucault by exploring the basic building blocks he used while constructing his 
theoretical standing. The following chapter will attempt to how Foucault   practiced and 
applied this theoretical standing to concrete historical experiences such as madness, 
criminality, sexuality and so on. Put differently, the first chapter deals with Foucault’s re-
theorization of power as a hypothetical construction whereas the second chapter deals 
with the way he converted this hypothetical construction into practical observations.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES AND BREAKDOWNS 
 
 
As has been already noted, Foucault’s aim is not to constitute a simple historical line 
deriving from continuous developments. Instead, despite including gradual 
transformations, his objective is to follow an archaeological line comprised of 
difference, change and discontinuity. He develops an archaeological approach which 
allocates a large place to descriptions of transformations. Each historical experience is 
practiced by Foucault through such an archaeological understanding, which searches out 
and focuses on the breakdown points of experiences throughout their history. 
 
At this point, I would argue that concentrating on breakdowns is not only a deliberate 
choice of methodology. It has a much more comprehensive and important character. 
The breakdowns are the archaeological turning points through which the construction 
of the structure of knowledge-power and gaze-power is brought to light. For that 
reason, the breakdowns are the crucial points that provide the confrontation of his 
theoretical approach with his practical observations.  
 
 
In accordance with this argument, I would also say that breakdowns may be the 
negatives of a historical reading. However, they are productive and positive elements of 
an archaeological reading since they reveal the moment at which a new power structure 
comes to the surface. First of all, breakdowns demonstrate the transformation of 
experiences into new channels that power takes form and new strategies that provide 
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both new forms and new bodies of knowledge. Secondly, they also constitute the 
modern modalities of power.  
 
For instance, in the experience of criminality the shift towards imprisonment as a 
dominant method of punishment was the breakdown point which converted criminality 
into a new power channel and a new stratagem supplying a new body of knowledge, for 
instance criminology, as well as constituting a new mode of control for measuring, 
classifying, normalizing and observing and thus disciplining. 
 
Each experience presents a breakdown point similar to this and thus the breakdown 
points may be the center around which experiences are analyzed. In other words 
through finding out the breakdowns of experiences, the constitution of modern modes 
of control and transformations of modalities of power can be revealed. 
 
For that aim, in this chapter three experiences – namely madness-asylum, clinic-autopsy-
anatomo-clinical medicine and sexuality-confessional – are explored. However, before 
arguing about these experiences, it must be noted that it would be a mistake to consider 
breakdown points as something demanded and represented unambiguously. In contrast, 
they may be the outcomes of the overlapping of different discourses and several 
transformations, and so they may carry some indistinct elements. As a result, it would be 
better to perceive these points as complex transformations rather than simple and 
clearly visible processes.  
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2.1 MADNESS AND THE ASYLUM 
 
In line with Foucault’s study of madness, I would say that the history of madness is the 
history of the distance between reason and unreason during which reason has succeeded 
in regulating and ordering unreason.  
 
Through this regulation, the fool has been carried over into mental illness. In the 
transition to mental illness, which means making madness clinical and turning it into a 
medical phenomenon, a complete mastery and disciplining of unreason has been 
accomplished. The principles of this mastery were, primarily, division and rejection. 
Therefore, the control over unreason resulted in a social idea of separation: the sane, we, 
as distinguished from the insane, which also means, on a larger level, the segregation of 
the normal from the abnormal. 
 
In other words, there was constructed a regulatory rational discourse that excluded the 
discourses and experiences of the other, corresponding to being insane and 
unreasonable. Through this exclusion, rational discourse constituted madness in 
reasonable terms and thus subjugated it. On the other hand, the same discourse, while 
derogating the experiences of the other, integrated its own identity. Through this 
integration, which means being both sane and reasonable, this rational discourse also 
subjugated the relevant variables of the individual and the social body, the population.  
 
In consequence, the control over unreason not only managed the administration of 
unreason on the basis of excluding insanity/abnormality, but it also managed the 
administration of reason on the basis of integrating sanity/normality. 
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During the constitution of such a regulatory discourse, there have been, popularly, five 
epochs: the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Classical Age or the Age of Reason, the 
19th century or the Age of Psychology and the 20th century. 
 
Throughout these epochs, until the 19th and especially the 20th century, complete control 
over madness could not be managed and similarly a discourse on madness could not be 
established. The mastery of madness and the victory of reason over unreason would 
have been possible only through the irreversible placement of insanity in a medical 
discourse in which madness is controlled through the authority of scientific knowledge 
beckoning to the emergence of a new knowledge-power structure. 
 
To reveal this emergence, Foucault starts with the Middle Ages. According to Cranston 
(1992: 14), “the medieval understanding of madness was coloured by images of the fall 
and of the will of god, of the beast and the metamorphosis and of all the marvelous 
secrets of knowledge.”  
 
Additionally, Cranston (1992) also argued that, when compared to the Renaissance, 
which, as Foucault noted (1965: 26), “gave madness the privilege of reigning whatever is 
bad in man,” the Middle Ages gave madness a relatively minor place in the hierarchy of 
vices. By the Renaissance, madness had become greatly disturbing and it was considered 
as an absolute laceration (Cranston, 1992: 14). 
 
The most remarkable feature of the Renaissance is the appearance of the ship of fools, a 
symbol of irrationality whose cargo were men with wandering minds. The existence of 
such a ship, I would say, is the necessary outcome of a society whose social structure 
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displays an extremely peculiar characteristic. This characteristic is the absence of 
mechanisms that either are disciplines as social control such as normalization, 
correction, measurement, supervision, etc., or disciplines as bodies of knowledge such as 
sciences which in the end supply the control and administration of the socially misfit. As 
a result of the absence of such channels, Renaissance society could overcome madness 
only in terms of a social exile.  
 
Put differently, in the Renaissance epoch it was not the subjugation of madness inside 
the city but the dispatching of the insane to outside the walls of the city. Behind the 
walls of the city madness wandered around without any descriptions, discourses or 
mastery.  
 
Indeed, as will be explained, there also exists a similar epoch in the history of genetics, 
the negative macro-eugenic movement, which reached its bloody pinnacle with Nazi 
Germany’s mass killings of Jews, psychiatry patients, and the disabled. More important 
than a mere fascist politics, this genocide was a method of dealing with those classified 
as socially or biologically misfit, of a society lacking in advanced control on genetic 
stock. 
 
Turning back to madness, it can be said that things were looking up by the 17th and 18th 
centuries, during the Age of Reason. In this era the remarkable feature no longer was 
the ship but the hospital in which, according to Foucault (1965: 35), “each form of 
madness finds its proper place, its distinguishable mark, and its long divinity.” 
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In the same era there appeared a massive police operation: the great confinement. It was 
no longer madness outside the city walls, but madness within the houses of 
confinement, the first example of which was the Hopital General established in 1656. 
Throughout the 17th century, such establishments spread throughout Europe, such as; 
the Hamburg Zuchthaus in Germany, and the Bride in England. Thus, in the 17th century, 
institutions and bounds were created to deal with the socially unfit. 
 
Very interestingly, the functions and the residents of these houses were heterogeneous. 
Inside them the unfit were confined, regardless of who they were and what they did: the 
poor – the old – the criminals – the unemployed- the vagabonds – the idle – the beggars 
– those with venereal diseases and the mad: all were confined together as a synthetic 
unity. Similarly, these institutions functioned simultaneously like a hospital, a prison and 
a workhouse. However, they were not medical establishments. As Foucault said (1965: 
40), “In its functioning, or, in its purpose, the Hopital General had nothing to do with 
any medical concept.” 
 
Indeed, according to Foucault (1965), the confinement was formulated in moral terms. 
First of all, during periods of economic crisis, confining those out of work served to 
reabsorb the idle. Secondly, outside periods of crisis, confinement supplied cheap labor.  
At this point it must be noted that despite its economic significance both during periods 
of crisis and not, confinement was not formulated in economic terms. What was 
important for the Classical Age was not to develop the economy through putting 
everyone to work but rather to develop morality through preventing laxness in morals, 
which was considered the main cause of poverty.  
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Actually, this ethical transcendence of the law of work determined what madness was 
and who the mad were, namely those differing from others and confined by their 
instability to work. Consequently, in the Age of Reason, madness was defined by an 
ethical conceptualization in which working was an ethical exercise and a moral 
guarantee. 
 
Indeed, as will be discussed in the following chapter, Sir Francis Galton, who started 
studies of eugenism and who first coined the word Eugene, used a very similar 
conceptualization. He considered Eugene as a radical science functioning for the 
destruction of a herd instinct present in human beings that impedes social development. 
 
Besides the social uselessness of insanity, in the Classical Age, madness was also 
perceived through a certain image of animality. Animality distanced madness from 
sickness in strict manners. In contrast with sickness, the mad were perceived as strong 
animals. As Laing also put it (1995: 76), 
 
He was not sick. Sickness was a later invention. Before he became finally 
invalidated in this further sense, those who were regarded as ill. On the 
contrary, the mad were excessively healthy; immense to many of the 
hazards to which their more sane, more frail fellow mortals were 
vulnerable.  
 
Besides being animal, the insane were those incapable of moderating their passions. 
After a while, in accordance with the link between passion and madness, the chemical 
perception of madness rose to the surface. After all, the sources of the disease were the 
liquid and solid elements of the body. More importantly, they were elements spurring 
the blind surrender to one’s desires. For instance, hysteria was the inability to control 
and satisfy one’s desires.  
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Briefly, on the one hand, madness was accused of a second sin:  The mad were not only 
incapable of working but also unable to master their desires. On the other hand, 
through this second sin, insanity was placed in one other conceptualization, namely a 
certain ethic of desire. 
 
Finally, the new content of guilt, necessarily, resulted in the treatment of madness in 
terms of punishment, coercion and instilling terror as a purification (Laing, 1995: 77). 
These changes, in turn, were accompanied by the birth of psychology. The 19th century 
became the Age of Psychology. 
 
Additionally, for Foucault (1965), these changes gave birth to a new domain which 
psychology and morality would soon occupy together.  
 
In his own words (1965: 158), “the scientific psychiatry of the 19th century became 
possible. It was in these ideas of the nervous and in these hysterias, which would soon 
provide its irony that is psychiatry took its origin.” 
 
Then, in the 19th century, madness entered into the framework of medicine, and 
different forms of insanity were assigned medical meanings. However, this medicine of 
the mind was something regulating and punishing. It was medicine based on ethics and 
moral punishments. Similarly, 19th century psychology was organized around 
punishment (Foucault, 1965: 182). Therefore, what were classified in the 19th century 
under the scientific and positive were derived from the moral perception of madness. 
Again, the very same situation can be observed in the history of genetic science. The 
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grounds upon which eugenicists based their scientificity were essentially authorized by a 
moral perception. 
 
Turning back to madness, in sum, as Cranston (1992: 13) noted, the “19th century 
reduced madness to the status of a mere disease.” In fact, the stigmatization of madness 
as a disease and the medicine of mind were also the outcomes of the crises of and 
growing protests against confinement started by the 18th century.  
 
First of all, the old confusion of leprosy again arose. It was believed that within the 
houses of confinement there was a medically contagious atmosphere, which could 
eventually infect the entire city. In a word, the houses of confinement became a threat 
to the population.  
 
This fear called homo-medicus into the world of confinement and with the entrance of 
the doctor into confinement, madness was confronted with medical thought. However, 
the doctor did not serve medical ends but instead was a keeper-jailer. This means, as 
Laing put it (1995: 76), “the doctor was brought in not primarily for the sake of the 
mad, but to protect the decent criminals from such perilous and unmerited contagion.”  
The fear of propagation was, indeed, abundantly obvious since under the threat of 
contagion, in the 18th century, a new form of hospital architecture was sought. It had to 
be something supplying an institutionalized medical gaze, which could observe, control 
and impede any contact, any contagion, any proximity and any circulation. Such a gaze 
was a call for a sterilized place of confinement, which would soon be the asylum.  
 
The second crisis that confinement faced was in the social economic realm. It was 
understood that confinement was a dangerous financial instrument since it confined not 
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only the mad and the criminal but also those whose industriousness could be raised 
through making them work. 
 
These economic worries broke the undifferentiated unity of confinement and 
confinement reserved only for the mad and the criminal. This was followed by the 
separation of insanity from criminality. At the end of the 18th century and the beginning 
of the 19th, it was both argued that the mad were ill treated by other prisoners and that 
alternately they were not treated any better than other prisoners. There emerged an 
urgent need for another place in which to put the mad. 
 
In fact, that was a turning point in the history of madness. Madness was liberated from 
the great confinement. But it was essentially linked to one other place: the asylum, the 
first examples of which were established by Tuke in England, Pinel in France and 
Chiarigu in Italy.  
 
In the asylum, first of all, a humanitarian effort put an end to the 17th century’s whips 
and chains. This effort was rational mastery and a kind of medical care of lunacy. As 
Stone expressed it (1995: 143),  
 
Non-medical practitioners now tried to work on the mind rather on the 
body, and by gentle rather than forceful methods … The locus classicus 
of this great reform is the picture of Pinel striking the chains from the 
lunatics at Bicetre.  
 
Secondly, since the only residents of the asylum were the mad, it became possible to 
study madness closely and to treat it individually. Thirdly, madness was treated in 
medical terms more than moral ones. The psychiatrist and psychiatry were in charge of 
entry. Even though he still was not the homo-medicus, who is able to know, but the 
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wise man, who is able to master, his entrance constructed a new relation between the 
medical and madness.  
 
In this new relation, insanity became the object of observation, classification and 
judgment through which the mad, through techniques of recognition and constant 
judgement, were even made to confess their madness. 
 
 Finally, after Tuke and Pinel and through the doors opened by the asylums, lunacy 
became a disorder and a mental disturbance that would be cured by the science of 
mental disease, psychiatry. 
 
All of this may seem, at first sight, as the liberation of madness in humanitarian terms. 
However, the liberation of madness was not a humanitarian movement. First of all, the 
separation of insanity from the masses of confined was not done for the mad 
themselves but rather for the sake of the population at large. Since the mad and their 
mental disturbances were thought to be dangerous. They were confined because they 
presented a threat. Secondly, nor was it the result of a scientific need or/and medical 
advance. In fact, the replacement of physical restraint with kind medical care was a 
matter of effectiveness. Kind treatment was much more effective than violent physical 
restraint.  
 
Thirdly, the promotion of madness, which means the separation of insanity from the 
great confinement, did not liberate madness from detention. The liberation of madness, 
as Foucault put it (1965: 247), “…linked madness more firmly than ever to 
confinement.”  
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Through the medicalization of madness, a scientific and institutionalized authority 
replaced the amorphous repressive power. Insanity was not controlled on the old model 
anymore. Setting madness free from its chains and the birth of the asylum were the 
historical turning point and the archaeological breakdown point of madness. This also 
was implied by Porter (1995), since according to him both Tuke and Pinel created 
authentic breaks in the history of madness (Porter, 1995: 198). 
 
The breakdown revealed a new power structure, and a new modality of power was 
established. First of all, it was a separating power. As Habermas clearly put it (1994: 
225), “making madness clinical, which first renders mental illness a medical 
phenomenon is analyzed by Foucault as an example of those processes of exclusion, 
proscription and outlawing.” The separating power made madness an object of 
stigmatization and labeling. 
 
Secondly, it was a police power, since physicians and psychiatry dealt with insanity that 
was dangerous for society. They served as a police force fighting against a threat. 
Thirdly, this new power structure was pastoral, since it studied madness individually and 
closely. The pastoral control made madness an object of painstaking control.  
 
Fourthly, this new power structure was discursive since it defined and placed madness in 
a medical discourse, which was assumed to be scientific. The discursive power made 
madness an object of a medical discourse.  
 
Fifthly, this new power structure was the gaze-power trying to hinder the contagion. 
The gaze-power made madness an object of observation. Finally, this new power 
structure was knowledge-power. It created disciplines as bodies of knowledge such as 
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psychology, psychiatry, and psycho-pathology. Knowledge-power made madness an 
object of knowledge.  
 
The features that this new structure of power represented, in the 20th century, provided 
a pure medical concept of madness. In the 20th century, madness, after all, was only 
madness. 
 
All of these show us that, as Guedon also noted (1994: 126), “…for him [Foucault] the 
question of insanity is only one facet of much more general problem. This problem is 
the institution of a new form of power as the necessary result of a new relation between 
power and knowledge and resulting in the organization of new social relations. It is this 
problem, as argued several times before, that Foucault tries to solve through experiences 
and their breakdown points.  
 
2.2 THE CLINIC, THE AUTOPSY AND ANATOMO-CLINICAL 
MEDICINE 
 
 
 
Foucault’s study of the clinic is another ultimate examination of the conceptual, 
epistemological and structural breakdowns that reveal the construction of new 
modalities of power, creating new candidates for modern control.  
 
The birth of the clinic exhibits this construction in terms of medicine and it reveals the 
transition from the medicine of health to the medicine of normality. In order to analyze 
this transition, Foucault starts with classical medicine, so called, the medicine of classes 
or/and medicine of species. The primary method of classical medicine was a tabular 
classification in which all diseases were classified into species on the basis of their 
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characteristics. Accordingly, diagnosis in classical medicine only required the careful 
determination of an abstract classification of diseases through their surface-level 
contents, meaning temporal qualities. As a result of this classification, in contrast to 
medicine of epidemics on the basis of the determination of causality, the medicine of 
species analyzed temporal series based on the classifications of non-causality and 
resemblance.  
 
In other words, what was ultimate for classical medicine was not the body but the 
symptom. Classical disease was an abstract essence that did not depend on any 
particular body. Thus, it was an abstract essence in a non-bodily space. That’s why, for 
classical medicine, as Gutting (1989: 112) notes, “...the patient is only an external fact; 
the medical reading must take him into account only to place him in parenthesis.” 
 
 This non-bodied disease is just an external force attacking and integrating itself into the 
body. And the causes of this external force were believed to die with the death of the 
body. For that reason, in classical medicine the corpse/dead body was not presented. 
Indeed, the distinction between the body and the disease was a result of the classical 
concern that tried to eliminate any kind of effect that could obscure the disease’s state 
of nature. Accordingly, the body was one of them, and the separation between the body 
and disease was the necessary consequence of this concern.  
 
In addition to the body, for classical medicine, there were two other fundamental 
structures that obscured the real nature of the disease: the civilized society and the 
hospital.  Gutting (1989: 114) put this as follows:  
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The sickness of more highly civilized societies take complex and 
diversified forms that obscure the real nature of diseases. Second is the 
parallel idea that like civilization, the hospital is an artificial locus in 
which the transplanted disease runs the risk of losing its essential 
identity. 
 
 This medical idea of protection of the disease’s state of nature was soon turned into a 
social project though which a natural locale for disease was sought. The only natural 
locale for disease in which the complex and diversified form of diseases could be 
avoided and in which the disease could follow its own course could be the family, which 
was a natural environment. In fact, such a project, besides providing a natural locale for 
the disease, may have reduced the costs of the disease to the nation (Foucault, 1991: 39). 
Obviously, one of the possible problems of such a project may either be those, lacking 
families or those, too poor to take care of their patients. The solution of this problem 
was found in setting up communal houses that would function as the family. 
Nonetheless, this solution was not enough to put the project into application. The 
project failed on account of economic and more importantly medical problems. This 
medical problem, mainly, was the risk of epidemic. At that moment, the proposals of 
Tenon and Cabanis entered onto the scene. What Tenon proposed was the duplication 
of the family, natural locus of the disease, through another space (Foucault, 1991: 42). 
 
According to Foucault (1991), firstly, through devoting itself to a particular kind of 
disease and secondly through arranging and distributing the patients and the disease, this 
space would be able to group diseases into orders and species and thus would be able to 
overcome the contagion both in- and outside the hospital.  
 
The integration of epidemic into medicine, through this special proposal, led to a new 
form of medicine opposed to classical medicine. This new form was the medicine of 
 57 
epidemics corresponding to a new medical consciousness. Through this new 
consciousness, the medical profession was nationalized, and the function of medicine 
was transformed from annihilating sickness to creating the ideal physical state. 
According to Gutting (1989: 116),  
 
Corresponding to this was a switch from a medicine of health to a 
medicine of normality. That is, the doctor was no longer seen merely as 
someone who restores the body to a healthy (not diseased) state but as 
the ideal physical state. 
 
In the late 18th century, the medicine of epidemics gained a new approach, nosology. Put 
simply, nosology was the problem of the health of the population, and noso-politics was 
an overall policy, which considered disease as an economic and political problem. Its 
general objective was the painstaking control and supervision of health and its relevant 
variables and conditions.  
 
In brief, the medicine of epidemics turned into a medical police that used nosology as a 
social control apparatus. This medical police was no longer only concerned with 
diseases nor did it only serve to cure the sick; it also administered the biological and 
physical conditions of everyday life and the general forms of existence and medical 
behavior. So the noso-politics of the medicine of epidemics managed to create a regime 
of health with regard to a massive public hygiene movement. The ultimate goal of the 
hygiene policy was to accomplish a healthy society made up of healthy bodies. For that 
goal, numerous medical, biological and physical habits were created. These habits 
directed habitation, nutrition, clothing, fertility, sexuality, reproduction, mortality, birth, 
etc. 
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No doubt, all of these medical interventions of the hygiene program were supported by 
authority. They were advised by qualified professionals, the doctors, who had the 
authority of medicine and science. Moreover, they were recommended by the state, 
whose legitimized aim was making all of its citizens healthy and happy. 
 
The doctor was the judge of health, who was professionalized as knowing the rules of 
healthy life. He became the technician and engineer of the population and its health. He 
everywhere taught the individual the basic rules of hygiene, he supervised the status of 
health, and he judged the fulfillment of these basic rules. Put differently, the doctors 
medicalized the body and the social body.  
 
In fact, what was achieved through this medicalization was a medicinal ethic of hygiene. 
This ethic was grounded both in the body’s relation with its own health and in the 
relation of the body’s health with the population. The family was the most constant 
agent of this medicalization. Because as Foucault noted (1980: 174), “the family is 
assigned the linking role between general objectives regarding the good health of the 
social body and individuals’ desire or need for care.” 
 
That was the ethical responsibility, in terms of medicine, of the parents of the child and 
of families to other families, the social body. In the end, a general technique of health 
began to develop a concerned and ethically responsible society very similar to the 
intergenerational ethics emerging through genetic counseling and testing. This general 
technique of health was the new form of medicine increasingly taking its place in the 
administrative mechanisms of power.  
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Finally, under the influence of noso-politics and the hygiene program, medicine was not 
only producing knowledge of illness and of the ill, but it also, as Foucault noted (1991: 
34),  
 
[W]ill embrace a knowledge of healthy man, that is, a study of non-sick 
man and a definition of the model man. In the ordering of human 
existence it assumes a normative posture … to dictate the standards for 
physical and moral relations of the individual and the society in which he 
lives. 
 
Concisely, the new medicine was regulated not only in terms of health but also in terms 
of normality. The natural consequence of such a medicine was the appearance of a 
medical bipolarity and the dividing principle of the normal and the pathological. 
 
Actually for Foucault, the clinic, which led to radical transformations in medical 
experimentation and discourse, was also a nosological field. According to Gutting (see 
for example Gutting, 1989: 119-120), the clinic functioned, first of all, as a charity 
hospital through which the poor and their sicknesses joined the program of public 
hygiene and social protection and thus noso-politics.  
 
The economic conditions of these charity hospitals were provided by the rich since they 
supported hospitals for the treatment of the poor. On the other side, the medical 
conditions of these hospitals were provided by the poor since the poor served as bodies 
and guinea pigs for medical study. Briefly, the poor exchanged their bodies for medical 
care and the rich exchanged their capital for a greater medical knowledge of illnesses, 
which could also affect themselves.  
 
 60 
First of all, such a functioning of the poor as objects of medical research made medical 
practice and experience, on the basis of concrete applications, possible. The bodies of 
the poor became a source of medical application and medical research. And thus, as 
Lasch put it (1995: 231), the motto of the clinic was “read little, see much and do 
much.”  
 
Secondly, in accordance with the do much part of this receipt, a new training and a new 
kind of teaching emerged. Thus, the clinic presented itself both in terms of teaching and 
science. In addition to this, the exhortation to see much led to the observation of specific 
cases on the bodies of the poor. Thus, a medical gaze was accomplished. 
 
Thirdly, the medical gaze and medical observation led to the transition from species of 
diseases to seats of diseases, for it located and individualized the diseases in the body. 
What is striking is the fact that this medical gaze was not an ordinary gaze but was in 
fact exercised by an observer who was professional: the doctor, authorized by an 
institution and his professional qualities.  
 
 As can be understood, the birth of the clinic in the 19th century was the breakdown 
point of medical experience. Through the birth of the clinic, a new form of medicine 
emerged: clinical medicine. And through clinical medicine the function of the hospital 
and the position of the doctor were all changed.  
 
However, I would argue that in the history of medicine, there exists one other 
archaeological breakdown point, namely the integration of pathological anatomy into 
clinical medicine by Bichat. This integration resulted in one other form of medicine: 
anatomo-clinical medicine.  
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At this point, it should be noted that even Foucault himself is, as Gutting argued (1989: 
130-131), “willing to claim that the great break history of western medicine dates 
precisely form the moment clinical experience became the anatomo-clinical gaze.”The 
anatomo-clinical gaze was made possible by the installation of death into life through 
the opening up of corpses. The primary instrument of this gaze, the autopsy, on the 
other hand, directed this gaze to death and pathology instead of living. Thus, death was 
no longer a risk for medical skill and knowledge. Instead it became, as Scott put it (1995: 
244-245), “a process for discovery … It seemed to promise the possibility for open, 
lucid mastery, for hope to establish a remarkable control by knowledge over the 
deteriorating body.”  
 
Similarly, the corpse was no longer the dead body in which the causes of disease 
disappeared. Instead it became the source of medical knowledge and the object of 
medical study and mastery.  
 
Subsequently, the perception of disease of anatomo-clinical medicine was also very 
different from the classical one. It was no longer a nature imported from outside. It was 
not an attack but a specific form of life. As Foucault put it (1991: 154-155) 
 
Disease will be merely the pathological from of life … disease loses its 
old status loses its old status as an accident, and takes on the internal, 
constant, mobile dimension of the relation between life and death. It is 
not because he falls ill that man dies, fundamentally, it is because he may 
die that man may fall ill. 
 
Briefly, through anatomo-clinical medicine the causes of illness were related to the cause 
of death. Death, a spreading process, became the point at which disease opened itself up 
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onto truth. In a word, death, in anatomo-clinical medicine, was the key source for 
knowledge of pathological form, i.e. disease.  
 
 Such an understanding of death and disease caused signs to lose their importance as 
direct indicators of disease (Gutting, 1989: 131). The sign as indicator was connected 
with the structure of and tissues within the body. Actually, this is what Foucault calls 
invisible visibility. Invisible visibility was the motto of pathological anatomy. More 
comprehensively put, the availability of corpses as objects of medical study brought the 
invisible to the level of visible. As Mchaul and Grace put it (1995: 71), “the body is the 
field of objectivity in which the visibility of the body is known through its invisibility, 
the anticipated inner space of the body revealed to vision by autopsy.”  
 
 As a result, through pathological anatomy, Foucault said (1991: 172), “death left its 
tragic heaven and became the lyrical core of man: his visible truth, his invisible secret.” 
All this shows us that clinical medicine and anatomo-clinical medicine gradually 
structured a new unity for medical science, which in turn made medicine one of the 
apparatuses of modern power. More comprehensively put, the medicine of epidemics, 
medical police, noso-politics, the construction of the concerned society in the 
framework of a medico-ethical responsibility, the professional medical gaze, the autopsy, 
I would say, all resulted, primarily, in the transformation of the body into a medical 
object. This medical object became the fundamental subject matter of the modern 
research hospital and the healthcare establishment that have constituted the main 
equipment of nosologic-biopolitics. On the one side, the research hospital was 
producing medicinal and medical knowledge about the body and its health. On the 
other side, healthcare establishments were supervising the body and its health in 
accordance with the knowledge produced by research hospitals. So that, the body was 
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liberated from the medicine of species but captured by professional and moral analyses, 
investigations and diagnosis within the hospitals and establishments. In other words, a 
new knowledge-power structure was constituted in terms of medicine and health. This 
new structure was a scientifico-administrative mechanism through which the body was 
cut into pieces. Its pieces were spread among a net of manipulation, supervision, 
regulation, isolation, and normalization  
 
In line with all of these arguments, it can be said that the Birth of the Clinic like the History 
of Madness, generally, explains the construction of a power mechanism which controls 
the very details of the individual and whose aim is to accomplish normal society comprised 
of the sane, the heterosexual, the healthy, the hard-working, and so forth. Specifically, 
the birth of the clinic is the physical, biological and medical aspect of these details. And 
it is the history of transformations and manipulation of these physical, biological and 
medical details to achieve the healthy society in which health is disciplined and thus 
normalized.  
 
During this disciplining, medicine has become a police power through the nosologic-
bio-politics of clinical medicine, a gaze-power through the birth of the clinic and 
discovery of autopsy, a segregating and normalizing power through the construction of 
a biopolarity within the clinic and through the innovation of pathology, and a discursive 
power through creating a medicino-ethical discourse. In a word, this disciplining 
constituted a knowledge-power, which in turn created a new channel for gathering, 
production, and accumulation of the knowledge of men. A knowledge-power, which 
used medicine to exercise itself.  
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2.3 SCIENTIA SEXUALIS AND THE CONFESSIONAL 
 
 
Throughout the history of sexuality, the primary theme has been the shift from a power 
organized around the menace of death in the field of sovereignty to a power organized 
around the administration of life in the domain of utility and value. During this history, 
the deployment of alliance has been displaced by the deployment of sexuality. Thus, 
sexuality is the history of the transition from the order of population in terms of the 
symbolics of blood and patronage to the management of population in terms of the 
analytics of sexuality. 
 
Within this history, like the histories of other experiences, a knowledge-power structure 
has been constituted. This knowledge-power structure created new bodies of knowledge 
such as biology, eugenism, the science of reproduction and physiology, etc. On the 
other side, these bodies of knowledge medicalized sex, and sex became an empirical 
object of medical research and scientific study. Thus it gained a guarantee of 
scientificity. Its scientific authority made it a knowledge normalizing sexual behavior. 
Subsequently, sex, as a normalizing knowledge, started to administer the way by which 
individuals made use of their sex. Consequently, sex became one of the ultimate 
channels that a normalizing power used to control the body, the social body and their 
future. 
 
For Foucault, what is mainly related to the constitution of sex both as a policing and a 
policed object is the discovery and subsequently, the administration of population as a 
live problem. As mentioned before, in the 18th century a political economy of 
population was created, and the population was perceived as an economic and political 
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problem with peculiar variables: habitation, clothing, nutrition, diet, general forms of 
existence, and so on. 
 
The history of sexuality demonstrates that sex was also among these variables. However, 
in regards to fertility, mortality, birth rates, life expectancy, transmittable illnesses, etc., 
sex was not only among these variables but it was also at the heart of them, and their 
political economy.  
 
The replacement of sex in the relative variables of the population tells us that it was no 
longer simply the quantity or number of the population, which was at the center of 
society’s strength. Instead of the number, hereafter, the quality of the population, the 
way by which the citizens makes use of their sex, became a biological vigor. 
 
 Thus, by the 18th century, sex was replaced on the agenda of social and political control 
as a policed object. And thus it became a public matter between the state and the 
citizen, which was regulated through public discourses not in the manner of repression 
of disorders but in the manner of observations, regulations, and analysis of sexual 
behavior. 
 
In short, the 18th century witnessed sex as a policed object. Nonetheless, what is both 
more important and closer to the aims of this study is the construction of sex as a 
policing object. The reason for that is to understand how sex was constituted as a 
policing object also reveals how sex was located as a channel that power takes as a form.  
Indeed, what provides sex the function of police is its interplay with truth and 
falsehood. More comprehensively put, sex has not only been formed in terms of 
pleasure and sensation but also has always been constituted as a problem of truth. 
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However, for Foucault the interplay of sex and truth has not always been produced by 
the same procedures. Similarly, it has not created the same effects. In contrast, Foucault 
talks about two main procedures producing the truth of sex: ars erotica and scientia 
sexualis (Foucault, 1978: 57-58). In the ars erotica the truth of sex is derived from the 
mastery of secrets and pleasure. On the other hand, for Foucault (1978: 58), 
 
Our civilization possesses no ars erotica. In return, it is undoubtedly the 
only civilization to practice a scientia sexualis.; or rather, the only 
civilization to have developed over the centuries procedures for telling 
the truth of sex which are geared to a form of knowledge-power strictly 
opposed to the art of initiations and masterful secret: I have in my mind 
confession. 
 
In fact, what made it possible for society to equip itself with a scientia sexualis was the 
displacement of alliance by the deployment of a new apparatus. This newly deployed 
apparatus was sexuality. The deployment of sexuality gave rise to a new formation and a 
new management of sex. It was no longer sex in the relations of alliance, meaning the 
governance of sex through permissions, proscriptions, recognitions, repressions and 
refusals around a simple system of rules and law. Instead, sex, from now on, took place 
in and was formed by the relations of sexuality.  
 
In a word, sexuality put into operation an entire mechanism of discursive practices. It 
functioned like a discourse and made sex a discursive object. On account of such a 
function of sexuality, the control over sex changed its shape and sexuality became a 
discursive power. The most remarkable feature of this discursive power was that it had 
extended areas and forms of control. In other words, it was not a single institution or 
sovereign but a strategic model depending on its own tactical elements that were 
discourses. And it was only by practicing these tactical elements that sex could manage 
to be exercised to penetrate, proliferate, innovate, and create bodies for painstaking 
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control. As a result, the reason for the deployment of sexuality for being was that it 
enabled such a detailed control of the body and the population.  
 
 On the other hand, the production and deployment of sexuality were developed 
through four great strategies that were deployed in the 19th century around the family 
cell: a hysterization of women’s bodies, a pedagogization of children’s sex, a 
socialization of procreative behavior, and a psychiatrization of perverse pleasures 
(Foucault, 1978: 114).  
 
In brief, the first strategy was about analyzing the feminine body both in medical and 
social terms. By the former, women’s bodies joined medical and medicinal practices and 
by the latter, women’s bodies were integrated into functional communication with the 
social body as the mother of the child and thus as the fundamental element of the family 
space (Foucault, 1978: 104). The second strategy was about the supervision of the child, 
who was a sexual potential. This potential would have to be supervised by parents in the 
social domain, by educators in the public domain and by doctors in the medical domain 
(Foucault, 1978: 104). The third strategy had to do with the medical and political 
socialization of couples and their fertility. With regards to the pathogenic value, birth 
control practices were medicalized. And in relation to this, couples became responsible 
for their fertility to the social body as a whole (Foucault, 1978: 104-105). The last 
strategy had to do with the assignation of the function of normalization and 
pathologization to the sexual instinct. Put differently, sex became a knowledge of 
sexuality that normalizes and/or pathologizes sexual behavior.  
 
As can be seen, all of these strategies were clustered around members of the family: the 
feminine body, infant sexuality, the biological relation between husband and wife, 
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fertility and birth, and the adult. At this point, what is most striking is the fact that all of 
these strategies were arranged around peripheral sexualities. In other words, it was not 
the mother but the hysterical woman, nervous mother and frigid view. It was not the 
child but the masturbating child and the hysterical girl. Similarly it was the perverse 
adult.  
 
Essentially, I would argue that the very reason for such an arrangement was about 
managing the way by which the female, the male and the child would made use of their 
sex and sexuality. Peripheral sexualities were corresponding to pathologies that could be 
normalized and corrected through the supervision of educators, doctor and 
psychiatrists. In a phrase, to constitute sex upon pathogenic values would have given 
way to normalization of the population and the body and thus would have been an 
urgent call for judges of sexuality. In turn, the pathogenic descriptions would have 
caused a normalized society.  
 
Then, as a result, these four great strategies, centered around peripheral sexualities, 
produced multiple discourses on sex. It developed a pedagogical discourse through the 
sex of children, a medical discourse through the body of women, a demographical 
discourse through the socialization of fertility and the regulation of birth, and a 
normalizing discourse through creating norms of the normal and the pathological.  
 At this point it becomes obvious that through these strategies the 19th century became 
an era of multiple discourses and sexual heterogeneity. Using Foucault’s own words 
(1978: 33):  
 
In the course of recent centuries, [the uniformity of Middle Ages] was 
broken apart, scattered and multiplied in an explosion of distinct 
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discursitivities which took from in demography, biology, medicine, 
psychiatry, psychology, ethics, pedagogy, and political criticism.  
  
Finally, the deployment of sexuality was the deployment of sex into multiplied 
discourses. Nonetheless, the deployment of sexuality gave rise to a more fundamental 
transformation: constitution of scientia sexualis by which Foucault indicated to 
confession and the confessing society.  
 
The confession has been the archaeological breakdown point of the sexual experience 
since it embodied truth and sex and transformed the economy of pleasure into a 
regulated system of knowledge. In a phrase, it revealed the knowledge-power structure.  
With a doubt, the confession was not a new discovery and similarly the confessional was 
not a new architecture. Western society, since the 16th century, has used confession. 
However, it still represents a breakdown point in the history of sexual experience. The 
reason is that in the 19th century the confession underwent some major transformations, 
all of which in turn were related to the will for sexual knowledge.  
 
First of all, the confessional became a place in which and by which a great archive of 
pleasures was established. According to Foucault (1978: 63),  
 
The motivations and effects it is expected to produce have varied, as 
have the forms it has taken: interrogations, consultations, 
autobiographical narratives, letters; they have been recorded, transcribed, 
assembled into dossiers, published, and commented on.  
 
Henceforth, pleasures and hidden secrets were continually recorded, and their record 
provided a great archive of sexuality and sexual behavior. In line with these records, a 
classification of sexual behavior and everyday pleasure was established including all the 
oddities, deviancies, abnormalities and pathologies. 
 70 
  
Secondly and more importantly, while recording and classifying sexual anomalies and 
oddities, they were no longer considered as sources or kinds of sin or guilt, but rather 
issues of life and the body. In fact the concrete reflection of such an understanding was 
the conceptualization of sex as a medical cause. In a phrase, sexual causality. Sexual 
causality for Foucault (1978) was considering sex as a cause of any- and everything. He 
put this as follows (1978: 65),  
 
From the bad habits of children … to the apoplexies of old people, 
nervous maladies, and the degeneration of the race, the medicine of that 
era wove an entire network of sexual causality to explain them … The 
limitless dangers that sex carried with it justified the exhaustive character 
of the inquisition to which it was subjected.  
 
As a result, sexual causality led to the formation a scientific discourse on pleasures and 
secrets. In the very framework of this scientific discourse, there no longer existed any 
place for the notions of sin and guilt. Instead perverse pleasure and sexuality were 
ordered around the concepts of normal and pathological. And thus, the confession 
functioned as a diagnostic and a therapeutic operation. Within this operation, perverse 
pleasure was not diagnosed in moral or religious terms, but rather by a medical 
discourse as a medical object. 
 
Additionally, it was this medical discourse that enabled any perverse pleasure to speak of 
itself. More comprehensively put, in Foucault’s words (1978: 101), 
 
There is no question that the appearance in 19th century…made possible 
a strong advance of social controls into this area of perversity but it also 
made possible the formation of a reverse discourse: homosexuality began 
to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or naturally be 
acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories 
by which it was medically disqualified.  
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This succinctly corresponds to the liberation of perverse pleasure, either homosexuality 
or any other kind of perversity. Like the insane freed from their chains, the perverted 
were freed from the burdens of moral guilt and sin. However, that was not a wholesale 
liberation. Despite the fact that it was no longer a sin, thereafter, it was a pathology, a 
medical anomaly.  
 
Similar to this, during the confession through the purification of individuals and 
unburdening them of their sins, individual was also liberated from his sins. However, I 
would argue that this purification was not a real liberation either. As has been stated 
before, the confessors are those who have something needing to be confessed, and thus 
who have something wrong with them. And during the confession they continually 
become aware of their perversity and anomalous nature.  
 
As a result, the liberation of perversity from the repressive ordering of law was followed 
by the scientific regulation of perversity with regard to norms and normalities. Thus, it 
indicates the creation of a new mode of control based on science, knowledge and 
normality. Moreover, the liberation of the individual from his sins was followed by the 
constitution of self by itself in terms of being abnormal. Thus, it indicates the 
technologies of self. On account of all of this, it can be said that the confessional has 
been the breakdown point for sexual experience.  
 
By this breakdown a knowledge-power structure is revealed through which the body is 
stimulated, pleasure is intensified, multiple discourses are constructed, knowledge of sex 
is produced and thus the will to knowledge is satisfied. In a word, the knowledge-power 
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structure made sex one of the channels that power took a  form  and turned into a 
policing object.  
 
According to Foucault (1978), in the second half of the 19th century, one other 
positioning of sex was arising. It was primarily concerned with the risk of transmittable 
diseases. This risk positioned sex as a control point for the state and as a biological 
responsibility for the citizen. As a consequence, for the sake of future generations, both 
a political and a medical project of heredity and degeneration appeared. This project 
developed two technologies of sex: state control of marriages and birth and a eugenics 
programs. However, by the end of the century, the project freed itself from the eugenic 
ordering of society and various forms of racism (Foucault, 1978: 119). Instead, in this 
period the deployment of sexuality left its hegemonic center and penetrated the entire 
social body, including the lower classes. It shifted from the bourgeois family to the 
entire population. Nonetheless, it was not a subordination of the lower classes. Instead 
it was the social and political control of the social body via sexuality. Foucault put this as 
follows (1978: 123), “what was formed was a political ordering of life, not through an 
enslavement of others, but through an affirmation of sex.” Then, briefly, Western 
society of the 19th century was organized by the deployment of sexuality and thenceforth 
Western society has been provided a sexual body.  
 
Finally, the experience of sexuality shows us that modern power is interested in life’s 
processes and conditions instead of death, which is the main concern of old power. Put 
differently, it is the power over life but death. Power over life has gradually been 
deployed around two axes to exercise its control: the body and the social body. In the 
first axis, it is the body itself in which utility, docility, creativity, usefulness, and capacity 
are disciplined and manipulated. Foucault (1978) calls this axis the anatomo-politics of 
 73 
the body. The second axis deals with regulation of the population. As Taylor also put it 
(1986: 79), “it serves the preservation and extension of life as the bio-mass, which is to 
over-riding direction of much modern policy.” Actually Foucault (1978) calls this 
second axis bio-politics. In line with the general aim of this chapter, finally, it can be said 
that the breakdown points of sexuality were the creation of a field of a knowledge, 
namely scientia sexualis, and scientific regulation of the effects of confession.  
 
Throughout the history of the sexual experience, through the deployment of sexuality, 
sex became a public issue, a police force, a discursive object, a normalizing knowledge, a 
medical object, and a medical reason as well as a medical result. Additionally, it was 
positioned as the center of biological responsibility. All of these positions of sex were 
the natural outcomes of and also natural causes of a power deployed over life. 
Furthermore, all of these positions correspond to various formations of sex as a power 
channel by a knowledge-power structure.  
 
On account of these discussions of historical experiences, I would say that, both in 
mental experience and clinical experience as well as sexual experience, the ultimate 
Foucaultian points are the breakdowns. These are the moments in which we think we 
are moving towards liberation and gaining freedom. This is true only in terms of 
liberation from chains and sexual prohibitions. But on the other side of the coin, the 
reality of the self and power, breakdown points are not liberating evolutions. Instead 
they are moments through which chains were replaced by the asylum and sin was 
replaced by pathology. Without a doubt, the old power was destroyed. But its 
destruction is due to the displacement of the old model by a new model. As Taylor put 
(1986: 79),  
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In going for liberation, we see ourselves as escaping a power understood 
on the old model. But in fact we live under a power of the new kind, and 
this we are not escaping, far from it, we are playing its game, we are 
assuming the shape it has moulded for us.  
 
This means that the individual subject is liberated from the old model but also subjected 
to a new one. 
 
Before finishing this chapter, it must be noted that its crucial importance for this study 
is due to two related points. First of all, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, 
here we have tried to show the ways through which Foucault brings his theoretical 
arguments into concrete forms. In other words, it shows how Foucault deals with 
experiences and how through these experiences he explains the constitution of new 
modalities of power and new modes of control.  
 
Secondly, as has been emphasized before, the main assumption motivating this study is 
that the science of genes is not only a scientific endeavor. It inherently includes a 
trajectory different from its scientific orbit. This assumption gives rise to two questions: 
Firstly, if it is not only a scientific concern, what more is it? Secondly, which tools can 
we use and which path can we take to find out what else the science of genes is?  
 
This chapter answers the second question. It provides us the necessary tools and a way 
to read genetic science. In short, these tools are breakdown points and the approach is 
the Foucaultian reading. Thus, this chapter supplies the path performed by Foucault to 
reconsider historical experiences and, in so doing, it provides us with the means to carry 
out an archaeology of genetic science.  
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CHAPTER III  
 
 
AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF GENETIC SCIENCE 
 
 
As was emphasized in the first chapter, this study tries to provide a Foucaultian reading 
of genetic science. The second chapter, by showing the way Foucault treats historical 
experiences, explores how such a reading can be realized. Put differently, the second 
chapter helps us to understand what a Foucaultian reading is.  
 
As a result of the second chapter and in line with the entire body of this study, I would 
say that one of the possible ways conducting a Foucaultian reading may be carrying out 
an archaeology of genetic science. 
 
Briefly, the first theme of an archaeological approach is the displacement of man, who 
guarantees the continuity of history, from his privileged position. In other words, 
according to the archaeological approach the human subject does not have any place. 
The second theme, which is also related with the first, is that, the main focuses of the 
archaeological approach are not the historical continuities assured by man. Instead it 
focuses on dislocations and breaks. Relatedly, the third theme of the archaeological 
approach is that it does not search for the creators. In other words, it is not a simple 
digging-looking for the origins of ideas and experiences. As Gutting also noted (1989: 
245), for the archaeological approach, “…who thought what first are simply irrelevant.” 
 Instead of the binary division of originality and banality, it looks for the relevance of 
discursive statements and general transformations of discursive regulations (Gutting, 
1989: 245).  
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In fact all of these themes derive from the primary goal of archaeology, which is to 
grasp change. On the other side, in order to grasp change archaeology deals with the 
relation between discursive formations and non-discursive formations. This relation, 
through the constitution of the connection between knowledge and power, provides 
causal explanations for changes and transformations, which I would call breakdown 
points. 
 
 Put differently, this relation produces new epistemes and new discourses, and it reveals 
a new power structure, which is knowledge-power. It is this knowledge-power structure 
and the connection between the power and this knowledge that lead to the changes in 
historical experiences. 
 
Consequently, the archaeological approach concentrates on discourse, and through 
discourses it explores the construction of knowledge-power and through this structure it 
explains change.  
 
These are the main bases on which this study conducts a Foucaultian reading on 
genetics. In the specific case of genetics, the archaeological approach provides the 
relation between discursive practices (such as molecular biology which leads to the 
understanding of what a genetic soma is) and non-discursive practices (such as 
biological-genetics database systems leading the ordering of genetic somas). Analyzing 
this relation undermines the visible structures and reveals the underground realities of 
genetic experience. In short, this relation enables us to analyze the molecular body, not 
as a spontaneous construct but as an intellectual and social construct experienced in a 
complex web of knowledge-power structures and a multiplied net of discourses. 
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As a result, in this study what a Foucaultian reading means is archaeology and what is 
done to apply this reading is to archaeologize the science of genes. Therefore, this 
chapter should not be considered as a representation of original roots of genetic science 
and its historical development. Instead it should be considered as an attempt to find the 
breakdowns, dislocations, discursive relations, and knowledge-power structure of 
genetic experience throughout its development. 
 
In fact, to make an archaeological analysis of genetic science, the 18th century may be a 
good starting point for two reasons. First of all, the first studies concerning the effects 
of heredity on people may go back to the 18th century, since in this century J.G. 
Kolreuter found that each parent contributes to their offspring equally and Malthus 
gave the first examples of the ideas of the struggle for existence and survival of the 
fittest.  
 
Secondly and more importantly, as has been argued before, the 18th century witnessed a 
discovery, namely that of population as a live problem with several manageable 
variables. Hereafter, the control of population as a simple unit was transformed into 
control over the relative variables of the population. Indeed, each historical experience 
that Foucault studied corresponds to a specific variable and a way of managing it. At 
this point, I would argue that the 18th century hereditary studies, 19th century Darwinian, 
social Darwinian and Eugenic studies and even 20th and 21st centuries modern genetic 
studies have not been just the simple outcomes of scientific advances deriving from 
scientific questions and curiosity. Rather, they all have also been the natural results of 
such a political economy of the population. The concern motivating them was how to 
manage the biological and hereditary variables of the population and also how to 
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produce new variables that have the potential to increase the effectiveness of control 
over the social body. And these new variables would soon be genes, chromosomes, 
DNA, and molecules. 
 
3.1 CHARLES DARWIN 
 
 
Surely, the discovery of the DNA as a manageable variable entailed a long process of 
knowledge accumulation including an archaeological breakdown point. This process 
includes several landmarks, the first of which may be considered as Charles Darwin and 
his theory of natural selection. However, it should also be noted that his theory was not 
entirely original. His ideas were shaped and influenced by many thinkers.  
 
First of all, as mentioned before, in 1798 Malthus had already published his Essay on the 
Principle of Population presenting his ideas on the survival of the fittest and struggle that 
came to be the main building blocks of Darwinian theory.  
 
Secondly, in 1809, the year Darwin was born, Jean Baptiste Lamarck presented his 
observations of living beings in his Philosophic Zoologique which put forward his ideas on 
evolution (Fijalkow, 1999: 453). Besides, long before Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859), 
W.C. Wells suggested natural selection in African populations. 
 
 As a result, under the influence of these pioneers, Darwin formulated his theory of 
natural selection. In fact, Darwinian theory is a very crucial landmark for the history of 
genetic science, since in the years to come his ideas found many supporters who were 
early hereditarians – social Darwinists. Additionally, social Darwinism would soon give 
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rise to the eugenics movement started by Galton. Thus, Darwin’s ideas shaped and 
created the essential philosophy underlying genetic technology. 
 
Darwin’s ideas are comprised of different sub-theories such as those of natural 
selection, gradualism, speciation and evolution, etc. However, in the current study, we 
will focus on four main ideas of Darwin – natural selection, quality enhancement, 
isolation, and artificial selection – since these were the ideas that nourished social 
Darwinism, eugenism and modern genetics. 
 
Natural selection is the struggle for survival among living things. Living organisms 
struggle for the continuity of their existence in either this way or that, and this struggle 
means that one side, being luckier or better, maximizes its chances of survival and 
minimizes the threat of non-existence, at least at that moment and in those conditions, 
and the other side becomes non-existent. In sum, it is the struggle for survival in which 
the weak/unfit are eliminated. 
 
This theory of Darwin’s provided a domain that soon would be occupied by social 
Darwinists. The best examples of social Darwinists were the French anthropologist 
Auguste-Clemence Royer and German zoologist Ernst Hackel. These two figures used 
the theory of natural selection to support the superiority of the natural order and natural 
events as compared to the social order and social institutions. As Fijalkow put it (1999: 
454), “…she [Royer] saw the process of natural selection as tending, by definition, 
towards improvement, and rejected the attempts of the Church charities and the state to 
impede the workings of natural order.”  
In Germany, similar ideas were supported by Hackel. He considered attempts to ensure 
the survival of the weak and sick to be misguided. He argued that despite artificial 
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methods of social order favoring the less advantaged, natural selection would continue 
to determine survival in the favor of the more advantaged. (Fijalkow, 1999: 454) 
 
 Concisely, social Darwinism believed in the superiority of biological law, which means 
that not only physical features but also social existence and the psychological make-up 
of humans are determined by biological laws. Actually, this idea in turn supplied the 
main roots for Galton’s ideas. Galton supported the idea that the betterment of people 
can only be accomplished by manipulating reproduction and heredity. 
 
On the other hand, the idea of the enhancement of quality is, in brief, raising the quality 
of stock through, for example, sowing the best seeds or breeding the finest animal every 
year and thus providing an improvement in the stock. Actually, this garden and animal 
production idea in turn created an idea of human cultivation: to apply garden 
production principles on human beings. And the possibilities of this application have 
become the main concern of positive eugeny in terms of the reproduction of superior 
types of races and humans.  
 
Similarly, isolation is the impediment of any interference in the process of change by any 
individual, adapted to different conditions, coming from another area (Wallace, 1975: 
119). The idea of isolation has been one of the main theoretical bases of negative 
eugeny, which was to impede any crossbreeding between superior and inferior 
individuals. In the hands of negative eugeny, isolation became a legitimate reason for 
restrictions on marriage and immigration. 
 
Lastly, Darwin’s idea of natural selection also raises the question of the possibility of 
artificial selection. Artificial selection would mean using technological knowledge and 
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capital to activate this knowledge so as to artificially evolve characteristics normally 
found in humans into characteristics humans normally lack, such as superior or sub 
qualities. This idea of artificial selection is represented in modern genetics through 
genetic engineering and especially human cloning, whose aim is to create perfect 
individuals with perfect genes through manipulating genetic mutation. 
 
Consequently, Darwin’s theory of natural selection represents a crucial landmark in the 
history of genetics, since it influenced successive landmarks and periods such as early 
herediterianism, eugenism, socio-biology (for example Richard Dawkin’s selfish gene 
theory) through constituting the origins of the philosophy that motivates studies on 
heredity and genetic make-up. 
 
3.2 EARLY HEREDITARIANS (F.GALTON) AND BIOLOGICAL 
DETERMINISM 
 
 
In the subsequent periods, some incomplete areas of Darwinian theory were filled in by 
the studies of Gregor Mendel. As Geetter said (2002: 13), “Mendel crossbred different 
varieties of peas and traced isolated traits over generations. His observations led him to 
determine the probability of inheritance.” As a result, through Mendel’s discovery of the 
principles of heredity the ideas of Darwin were, in a sense, proven to be scientific. More 
importantly, Mendel’s discovery marked the birth of modern genetics. 
 
Darwin and Mendel together constituted the necessary atmosphere for eugenism to 
flourish. Galton popularized eugenism, firstly. Galton’s main aim was to found a radical 
science of human heredity that could detail the influence of heredity on the course of 
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human evolution and thus improve human heredity. Put differently, he imagined a 
radical science that could impede the racial qualities of future generations and improve 
the inborn qualities of a race. 1 
 
In fact these claims of Galton arose from a single concern. He believed that human 
populations, like oxen and sheep, exhibit a herd instinct which impedes the social and 
moral progress of humans and human society and which therefore constitute a barrier 
to the attainment of freedom, wisdom and social evolution. What he wanted to deal 
with was this herd instinct. For him, in order to overcome such an obstacle to 
humanity’s evolutionary development, what needed to be done was an illumination and 
explanation of heredity and its influences on the human body.  
 
 These ideas of Galton are of crucial importance for two reasons. First of all, his ideas 
ushered in the period of the eugenics movement beginning approximately with 1883, 
the year he coined the word eugenics, and finishing by around 1945 and the 1950s. 
Secondly and more importantly, the idea of herd instinct conceptualized heredity as an 
ethical guarantee of the moral and social progress of human society. For him, anything 
impeding or retarding social progress is unethical, whereas conversely anything 
accelerating social progress is ethical. Human heredity was missioned by Galton as an 
agent of social improvement and progress and integrated it into an ethical exercise. 
Briefly, it can be said that, from the first day, the science of genetics was constituted in 
moral terms for the betterment of society and was provided an ethical transcendence 
which would soon become one of the main discourses on human heredity in the hands 
of eugenicists.  
                                                           
1  Galton,F. 1804. Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope and Aims, Quoted in Iredale, R. 2000. “Eugenics and Its 
Relevance to Contemporary Health Care.” Vol.7 Issue 3 Nursing Ethics EBSCO Files Item: 3177920. 
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Very importantly, both the moral perceptions feeding off of this ethical transcendence 
and the integration of heredity into an ethical discourse were related to and cited by 
scientific theories. These scientific counterparts of the ethical discourse on heredity were 
primarily biology and the law of nature, which in turn gave rise to biological 
determinism.  
 
The nature of law was, as has been emphasized before, the idea that both biological 
make-up and the social existence of human beings were almost entirely determined by 
their germ plasma. This idea was necessarily followed by another argument, biological 
determinism, which put forward the superiority and overwhelming force of biological 
law over environmental factors both physical and social. In other words, environmental 
factors including physical conditions and social conditions such as social institutions, 
social reform and social rehabilitation, hereafter, were considered as ineffectual in 
dealing with both biological and social degeneration.  
 
At this point, I would argue that this biological determinism using heredity created 
identical effects to those created before by the great confinement. As mentioned before, 
the main theme of confinement was to corral social undesirables together – the 
vagabonds, the idle, the poor, criminals, the mad – regardless of who they were and 
what they did. Similarly, biological determinists linked any and every sort of 
undesirability to the degeneration of heredity. The insane, epileptics, alcoholics, 
criminals, prostitutes, junkies, the feebleminded, homosexuals, those suffering from 
tuberculosis and syphilis, all were confined under the same small germ plasma, if not in 
physical, then in scientific and moral terms.  
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On account of this, one other argument I would emphasize is that the justification given 
to confine all these different people together concerned their common feature. Despite 
their differences, they were all unhealthy, either socially or physically, as a result of their 
inferior hereditary structure and thus they constituted great obstacles to hereditary social 
progress, which could only be achieved through the betterment of hereditary 
characteristics.  
 
 Indeed, the perception of social misfits as obstacles to social progress led them to be 
exposed to a concept of guilt. Like the mad who were unable to work or master their 
desires and thus were judged guilty, the socially unfit were socially or physically 
degenerate and thus unable to contribute to hereditary progress. These biologically 
guilty people, like the insane who were treated violently, were punished violently both 
by the state itself and by the experts of heredity, eugeny professors. It is precisely this 
punishment, I would say, is what Galton called negative eugeny. 
 
3.3 NEGATIVE EUGENY 
 
 
Negative eugenism was an attempt to minimize the risk of transmission of inferior, 
harmful traits to future generations. As Reich noted (1995: 765), “negative eugenics 
sought to encourage the socially unworthy to breed less or, better yet, not all.” The 
primary instruments of the negative eugeny program – in other words, the primary 
punishment techniques used by this program – were sterilization, disinfection and 
marriage prohibitions against those considered to have bad genes. At the end of the 19th 
century, states began to pass sterilization laws and in the 20th,  sterilization techniques 
were perfected (Geetter, 2002: 1).  
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In 1933 a sterilization law was passed in Germany and by 1945, 360,000 persons were 
covered by this law. In 1941, 70,000 people were officially disinfected for the sake of 
society’s biological and social health (Fijalkow, 1999: 456).  
 
Very importantly, the unfit were sterilized and disinfected compulsorily, and these 
compulsory sterilizations gained legitimacy both in terms of science and heredity and in 
terms of politics with regard to public hygiene. Thus, in the early 20th century, eugenism 
functioned as a police force that conducted nosologic policies on the population. At this 
point it is possible to say that 20th century eugenism was social eugenism in contrast to 
modern genetics’ individual eugenism and voluntary manipulation.  
 
In fact, these punishments and the negative eugeny program may also correspond to the 
social exiling of the unfit. In the 1900s, despite the discovery of the gene, there still 
existed no professionally applicable body of knowledge – such as gene therapy or 
human cloning – to deal with the hereditarily unfit. Therefore, the only possible thing to 
do this could be, for the sake of management of heredity as one of the variables of the 
social body, the isolation of the unfit from the remaining population. In other words, 
the selective elimination of people having undesirable traits from the breeding 
population (Bender, 1974: 194). 
 
For that reason in this era, negative eugenism prevailed much more than positive 
eugenism, which means, according to Reich (1995), multiplying and fostering the 
representation of traits defined by eugenicists as desirable and valuable (Reich, 1995: 
765). Indeed, a sophisticated, comprehensive application of positive eugeny would soon 
be provided by modern genetics.  
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 However, this social exiling was not in physical terms but in terms of sterilization and 
disinfection. Nonetheless, in Nazi Germany, the social exiling of the unfit was also 
accompanied with the physical exiling by killing German psychiatric patients, Gypsies 
and especially Jews. As McInerny said (1974: 181), “It is the principle that an innocent 
human being can be killed if his existence is convenient or uncomfortable to others or if 
those others deem him unfit to live.” 
 
In fact, the Nazi genocide of the Jews was not a simple result of the German state’s 
fascist and racist policies. On the contrary, it was a macro- negative eugenics policy 
(extermination of reproducing members of various ethnic groups) whose origins came 
from the law of nature.  
 
It was this germ plasma determinism which spurred the Nazis to wage war against 
genetic variation and led to the concurrent emergence of racist and fascist policies of the 
Nordic race. As Reich also noted (1995: 766),  
 
They [eugenicists] concluded that socially desirable traits were identified 
with the races of Northern Europe, especially the Nordic race, and that 
undesirable ones were identified with those of Eastern and Southern 
Europe. 
 
Put differently, the content of hereditary guilt, gradually, was carried to an inter-racial 
level. They were no longer only the socially unfit of a nation who were guilty of being 
unable to contribute to the betterment of society, but other races were also considered 
to possess inferior genes and traits.  
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Accordingly, it was argued that the only way to overcome the deterioration of the 
Nordic race through inferior races was to pass immigration laws.  
In Reich’s words (1995: 766):  
 
In the USA, eugenicists helped obtain passage of the Immigration Act of 
1924, which sharply reduced eastern and southern European 
immigration to the USA… The laws were declared constitutional in the 
1927 US Supreme Court decision of Buck V. Bell, in which justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes delivered the opinion that ‘three generations of 
imbeciles are enough’ 
 
Consequently, under the effect of an ethical discourse constructed, authorized, 
improved and legitimized by scientific explanations and theories, the eugenics 
movement created public hygiene programs within individual nations and a racial 
hygiene program among various nations. 
 
 In contrast to the extermination and genocide techniques of negative eugenics, positive 
eugenics was the manipulation of a race as a macro term and preferential breeding as a 
micro term. Therefore, the positive eugeny program was much more dependent on 
manipulating and engineering hereditary traits than on social exile. However, I would 
say that in 1900-1945, positive eugeny could not be applied since in the 1900s, as 
mentioned above, there existed no advanced techniques to transform random mutation 
into intentional and rational mutation. Thus, it still would be possible to assert that the 
1900s’ eugeny program corresponded to the era of the ship of the fools. Like the mad 
who were exiled outside the city walls, those with bad genes were exiled from the 
general population’s reproductive pool sometimes by sterilization, sometimes by 
immigration laws and sometimes by disinfection and marriage restrictions. 
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Additionally, I would also assert that the beginning of the practice of positive eugeny – 
which I would eventually call gene therapy, genetic engineering, the foundation of 
sperm banks and human cloning – created effects similar to the liberation of the mad 
from their chains. Positive eugenics practices liberated the unfit from violent treatments 
both official and unofficial and thus beckoned to a new era in which the welfare state of 
genetics was constructed.  
 
 The first remarkable result of all of these arguments is that individuals’ health status, 
beginning from Darwin and going further with the eugenics movement, was equated 
with their hereditary fitness to society. More clearly, in those days being unhealthy was 
related to being hereditarily unfit. Thus, as a natural consequence, in this period health 
was conceptualized in a hereditary discourse and as Fijalkow noted (2000: 455), 
“…health was taken hereditary…”  
 
 On the other hand, and as a second result of these arguments, it can be said that from 
Darwin to social eugenists, heredity was constituted within an ethicized scientific 
discourse. In other words, the scientific findings of biology and of Darwin, Mendel and 
Galton created an ethics of social progress as part of a social and demographic control.  
 This is a very important result for this study, since it is striking as the archaeological 
roots of genetic science. These roots tell us that genetic science was started not as a 
matter of pure science but as matter of governing a system of social relations. In brief, it 
was not only a new area of scientific research but also the usage of scientific findings to 
create demographic polices in order to address social crises and problems through 
medically contrived and ethically legitimized solutions. Therefore, it was an issue of 
power-body relations. 
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 However, this ethical discourse would very soon be broken and heredity would very 
soon be separated from its ethical discourse. 
 
3.4 THE BREAKDOWN POINT 
 
 
In broader terms, after the violent policies of the negative eugeny program in Nazi 
Germany, criticisms of eugeny began to mount. Eugenics became a source of horror 
both nationally and internationally. Moreover, over time it became identified with the 
Nazi movement and thus the majority of other nations, especially the United States, 
began to distance themselves from this Germanic ideal.  
 
More importantly, a more comprehensive and extensive body of knowledge about genes 
and heredity was emerging. This new knowledge provided more advanced techniques 
under which negative eugeny and its punitive techniques would soon be displaced by 
positive eugeny and its manipulative techniques. Thus, a breakdown that caused radical 
transformations of the genetic experience began to emerge as the dominant force by the 
1950s and ‘60s. 
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3.4.1 GENETIC TESTING 
 
 
The breakdown of genetic experience was made possible through new, highly advanced 
techniques – genetic counseling, fertility studies, genetic screening and monitoring, 
genetic tests, chromosomal analysis, etc. – that were the results of extensive knowledge 
about genetic stock (for example, the discovery of DNA in 1953) and that resulted in a 
new knowledge-power structure (for example, bio-informatics).  
 
This breakdown, like breakdowns of other experiences, could at first glance be seen as a 
humanitarian movement which put a halt to violent techniques and the punitive power 
of negative eugeny and which liberated from guilt those defined as hereditarily and 
socially inferior. Nonetheless, in a deeper sense, there is no real distinction between the 
liberation of the mad from their chains and the liberation of individuals from negative 
eugeny. The day the mad were freed from their chains they were integrated into the 
center of much more complex relations. Similarly, the day when negative eugeny came 
to disappear, individuals and their hereditarily traits were integrated into the center of 
new relations between power and the body. DNA was placed onto society’s agenda for 
the future. It became the ultimate issue of painstaking control over the social body and 
the body. 
 
 Here it should be mentioned that, no doubt, without a knowledge of what an autopsy 
is, it would not be possible to understand what anatomo-clinical medicine is. Similarly, 
knowledge of what new genetic techniques are is a must for understanding their effects 
on genetic experience. 
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According to Nordenson (1999: 1), “genetic testing examines the genetic information 
contained inside a person’s cells to determine if that person has or will develop a certain 
disease or could pass a disease to his or her offspring.” 
 
Similarly, according to Geetter (2002: 5), “a genetic test can determine whether a patient 
contains a normal or an abnormal copy or copies of a gene.”On the other hand, as 
Geetter put it (2002: 5),  
 
The genetic abnormality refers to a mutation that alters a protein in such 
a way that that protein cannot function normally. There are roughly 5700 
known genetic disorders, approximately 300 of which are currently 
identifiable using genetic testing 
 
Briefly, genetic abnormality or genetic disease is mutation in a chromosome or gene that 
results in a deterioration of function. As is well known, to diagnose these mutations of 
the base pairs of genes or chromosomes, several different testing techniques are used 
and have been developed. Briefly, as noted by Nordenson (1999), the types of testing 
can be grouped as follows: direct DNA mutations that analyze the mutations of bases 
which in turn make the gene nonfunctional and cause disease; family linkage studies that 
use maps of the family tree; chromosome analyses that examine structural chromosome 
abnormalities; carrier testing and predictive testing that tell patients whether or not they 
carry or will develop a certain disease; pre-symptomatic testing, i.e. testing before 
symptoms occur; cancer susceptibility testing; prenatal and postnatal chromosome 
analyses; etc. 
 
As can be understood from the above classification, genetic testing is a wholly medical 
technique. It deals with and reveals things that used to be called inferior hereditary traits 
by social eugenicists. However, from now on, the conceptualization of bad genes has 
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been replaced by mutation, which is a genetico-medical term. This gives rise to a very 
important result: inferiority in one’s genes is no longer considered in a context of guilt. 
In other words, similar to the transformation of sexual perversity from being a sin to 
being a pathology, bad genes have been transformed into medical mutation, which in 
the end makes bad genes a pathology. In a word, both genes and genetic experience are 
medicalized and as Rock noted (1997; 109), “geneticization builds upon 
medicalization…” 
 
3.4.2. MEDICALIZATION OF THE GENE AND GENETIC COUNSELING 
 
 
This is what the breakdown point of genetics was. This was the archaeological turning 
point for the history of genetics. The gene, hereafter, has been integrated into a 
complete medical discourse in which health and illness were reclassified along genetic 
lines. Concisely, the breakdown point of genetics has been the medicalization of the 
gene. The medicalization of the gene resulted in a genetic discipline returning to its 
scientific origins and displacing its ethical discourse with a scientific-medical discourse. 
 
 Actually, this turning point was followed by genetic counseling. The reason for this was 
the need for a counterpart that could exercise and regulate the results of testing. I would 
say that this cooperation between counseling and testing resembles the cooperation 
between the confessor and the listener. The confessors, through telling their secrets, 
represent various pieces of knowledge about themselves and their perversities, and the 
listener turns these secrets into functional and regulated knowledge. Similarly, the 
genetic test reveals the most hidden secret of the body, DNA and gene sequences. In 
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this case the one acting as a listener is the counselor (medical geneticist). The counselor 
regulates the results of the tests and makes them manageable.  
 
3.5 MEDICINE OF GENETICS AND MOLECULAR GAZE  
 
 
One other consequence of genetic counseling is the displacement of social eugenism 
with an individualized eugenism. More comprehensively put, for social eugenism the 
ultimate elements were the eugeny professor plus society and race as its subjects. On the 
other hand, for individualized genetics the important elements are the doctor and the 
patient. The main aim of individualized eugenism is not the curing of the individual for 
the sake of society but rather curing the patient only and purely for the patient’s own 
sake. Thus the societal scale, public hygiene and accordingly public policy are replaced 
by the patient scale, individual hygiene and health policy.  
 
Actually, this shift in the scale of modern genetics corresponds to the integration of 
genetics into healthcare. Thus, the story beginning with classical medicine and 
continuing with, respectively, epidemic medicine, clinical medicine and anatomo-clinical 
medicine, is completed by genetic medicine.  
 
Genetic medicine is sharply different both from classical and anatomo-clinical medicine. 
For classical medicine, as argued before, the main theme is symptoms, and for anatomo-
clinical medicine the main themes are tissue and the structure of the body. On the other 
hand, genetic medicine correponds to a shift from tissues to DNA and molecules. From 
now on, what gains importance is the very inside of the body, which cannot be seen by 
a simple gaze.  
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Consequently, genetic medicine is the moment when a simple medical gaze is 
transformed into a molecular gaze and simple medical observation has been turned into 
molecular modalities of surveillance.  
 
 At this very point, there again occurs a hugely important transformation. This 
molecular gaze deals with a very new knowledge, a knowledge hidden in DNA as 
packages of codes that must be deciphered. This knowledge is not a simple body part; it 
is invisible but productive, creative and determining. It exists on a new level which 
cannot be achieved through traditional medical techniques. It is, in Kay’s 
conceptualization, the submicroscopic level. In his own words2 (Kay, 2000: in Rose, 
2001: 13),  
 
The genetics body differs on all accounts from this eugenic body. Most 
notably, it is conceived on a different scale. In the 1930’s, biology came 
to visualize life phenomena at the submicroscopic region – between 10-6 
and 10-7 cm. 
  
Thus, the transition to the molecular level means the discovery of a new knowledge and 
new resources for fighting disease, which is found in the DNA and molecules. 
Accordingly, this new knowledge supplied a new body of knowledge, which in turn 
created a new knowledge-power structure. 
 
The first result of such a knowledge-power structure was the multiplication of 
discourses regarding the gene. First of all, it is a fact that the gene was integrated both 
                                                           
2  Kay, L. 2000. Who Wrote The Book of Life? Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni. Pre, Quoted in Rose, N. 2001. 
“The Politics of Life Itself.” Theory, Culture and Society Vol 18(6): 1-30   
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into a scientific discourse in terms of molecular biology and chemistry and a medical 
discourse in terms of mutated genes and pathology.  
 
Importantly, this medical discourse also constructed a reproductive discourse, since the 
main aim of genetic medicine was not only therapeutic. It also had breeding purposes, as 
mentioned by Etzioni (1972: 103): “(that is, to order a child with certain desired 
attributes [e.g., six feet tall and with red hair], the way attributes to racehorses and show 
dogs can be specified in advance).”  
 
Secondly, as briefly argued before, a technological and an industrial discourse also 
appeared accompanied by private foundations and research centers. The biotech and 
genetech companies became the ultimate elements of modern genetics. Modern genetics 
– its techniques, therapies and diagnosis – entailed an advanced biotechnology and bio-
industry. As mentioned by Rose (2001: 15), 
 
For life at the molecular level is only knowable through complex and 
expensive apparatus: electron microscopes, ultracentrifuges, 
electrophoresis… In the post-war period, founded for the strategic 
development of the life sciences were provided by newly established 
public research councils, together with private foundations such as 
Rockefeller with their own agendas.  
 
 However, that was not the entire story since a commercial discourse was also 
constructed. Especially through genetic engineering and patenting of genes, as Kaufert 
argued (2000: 824), “human tissue has become a capital and body parts are property.” 
Consequently, the gene pathologized under a medical discourse has also been objectified 
as an economic value within a commercial discourse.  
 
 96 
In addition to all of the above, the discourse on the gene also includes a political 
discourse. The main aim of this political discourse is to manage health through body 
policies. This discourse is in fact much more related to genetic engineering and human 
cloning techniques that can help states promote the health of their citizens, breed a 
wiser citizenry and stamp out diseases (Etzioni, 1972: 103).  
 
One necessary result of the multiplication of discourses on DNA has been the 
multiplication of experts on genes. In other words, the list of judges of genes is no 
longer comprised only of eugenicists. According to Kaufert (2000: 828), 
 
The list continued through insurance companies, their agents and 
association, biotechnology firms, universities, journalists, lawyers, health 
bureaucrats, and policy makers, politicians at various levels of 
government, stockbrokers and investors, consumer groups, critics and 
health activists, and even a Cyprian bishop.  
 
3.6 MOLECULAR RISK AND MOLECULAR POLITICS  
 
 
In addition to all this, the new molecular vision of life and the knowledge-power 
structure as its accompaniment resulted in one other fundamental transformation: the 
transformation of Foucault’s biopolitics into molecular politics. As Rose said (2001: 1), 
“…as truth regimes of the life sciences have mutated, contemporary biopolitics has 
become molecular politics.” 
 
It can be said that the origins of molecular politics are genetic testing and genetic 
counseling. Genetic testing deciphers the risk of an individual getting a genetic disease. 
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On the other hand, genetic counseling governs, manages and administers this 
deciphered risk through testing.  
 
In fact, risk assessment has always been one of the main elements of medical science. 
However, with modern genetics’ ability to detect pre-existing genetic conditions, the 
concept of risk has supplied a statistical guarantee. This means that, in contrast to all 
other predictive tests, genetic techniques provide the most constant and most perfect 
information about risk. 
 
Therefore, one could argue that the essence of molecular politics is primarily the will to 
know about risk. Secondly, it is the enhancement of the constancy and predictivity of 
the knowledge of risk. Thirdly, it is the governing both of risk and the knowledge of 
risk. 
 
 Indeed, what I would most like to explore is molecular-risk politics, since this discloses 
how genetic experience affects the way we are governed and the way we govern 
ourselves. The way the self is governed concerns the control of both risk itself and the 
individuals themselves through advice coming from a multiplicity of sources given by 
various experts/judges of the genes.  
 
Everywhere genetic professionals, scientists, doctors, employers, insurers, biotech firms, 
and genetic counselors tell individuals what to do. Individuals are wrapped up in a huge 
web of advice teaching them how they can and should live with their own molecular 
risk. Novas and Rose argue that Foucault would characterize this attempt of experts to 
regulate the self’s relations with risk as “ethical substance” (Novas & Rose, 2000: 502)  
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This is because advice regarding genetic risk presents to individuals the proper ways to 
regulate their lives and deal with their own molecular risk. For example, an individual 
with a susceptibility to cancer is advised to do and not do numerous things that are the 
norms and standards of health. Thus, the predictive testing is followed by preventive 
medical and scientific standards, which become ethical principles that constitute 
individuals’ relations with their diseases and lives. In short, the individuals themselves 
and their lives are re-engineered at a molecular level, supplying them with a new ethical 
substance, which is risk- and gene-oriented. 
 
3.7 ETHOPOLITICS 
 
 
Molecular risk provides not only a new ethical substance. It not only constitutes the 
relation between individuals and their risks but also through constituting this relation, it 
also serves as a fundamental factor for the construction of self by self. In other words it 
creates a new technology of selfhood, which can be best understood by the 
conceptualization of ethopolitcis. Ethopolitcs can be considered a self-technique through 
which human beings attempt to make themselves better than they are (Rose; 2001: 18). 
According to Rose (2001: 18), 
 
While ethopolitical concerns range from those of lifestyle to those of 
community, they coalesce around a kind of vitalism: disputes over the 
value to be accorded to life itself: quality of life, the right to life or the 
right to choose, euthanasia, gene therapy, human cloning and the like.  
  
In a word, ethopolitics concerns the maximization of the chances of life. And life 
becomes a strategic enterprise centered around the body as a biological being. Similarly, 
individuals become enterprisers who undertake their own soma as genetic and molecular 
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beings. Thus, from now on, they are no longer only sociological, political and 
psychological identities. They understand that they also are biological identities whose 
main task should be the improvement of their somas.  
 
This point reveals how the conceptualization of the somatic individual has been 
constructed. Somatic individuals know that they are the owners of somas comprised of 
molecules and chromosomes that not only need the care of professionals but also their 
own careful attention. In a word, a new sort of identity is integrated into the families of 
Homo: Homo-ethopoliticus, individuals who are aware that they are molecular somas and 
who know that they should take care of their molecular somas. Consequently, 
individuals become responsible for their somas and their biology. In turn it becomes an 
ethical responsibility for individuals to be responsible for their bodies and to be active 
participants of relations with their biology.  
 
Actually, these all in a sense beckon to the construction of a regime of and will to health 
in terms of genes. In this regime of health, individuals are confronted with the 
deployment of genomic information. It is this genomic information, which enables 
individuals to become aware of their bodies since through this information they learn 
whether or not they are at risk genetically. Put differently, they learn whether or not they 
are genetically healthy. On account of this, health and health status are re-catalogued on 
genetic axes in terms of genetic risk, and this risk simultaneously becomes a factor and a 
condition for defining people. The simple dichotomy of healthy and unhealthy is 
displaced by the definition of individuals as individuals at risk or individuals not at risk 
and/or as carrier individuals. 
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3.8 MOLECULAR LIFE AND SOMATIC INDIVIDUAL 
 
 
It should be noted that the carrier individual is a new type created by modern genetics. 
The carrier is a person who has a mutated gene associated with a disease but is not 
personally somatically affected by this mutated gene and disease. Therefore, such 
individuals carry the defeated gene but do not develop the disease and its symptoms. 
Therefore, the carrier individual has an asymptomatic disease and is thus 
asymptomatically ill. 
 
I would argue that asymptomatic diseases could only be the discovery of genetic 
medicine and/or the medicine of genetics. For diagnosing an asymptomatic disease 
means deciphering the information hidden in genes. Neither classical medicine, the 
medicine of epidemics, clinical medicine nor anatomo-clinical medicine had techniques 
providing a gaze that could penetrate inside cells.  
 
This molecular gaze creates a new definition regarding the body, describing the body in 
terms of numbered chromosomes. Thus, the body is separated into submicroscopic 
parts and it is subjected to chromosomal numberings. For example, as Novas and Rose 
put it (2000: 487),  
 
One condition involving fronto-temporal Dementia and Parkisonism is 
known as FTDP-17 because it is linked to a number of mutations in a 
specific region of chromosome 17. Increased susceptibility to breast 
cancer has been linked to the mutations known as BRCA1 and BRCA2 
on chromosome 13.  
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In addition, I would also argue that the asymptomatically ill necessarily create a new 
social category and a new health status conceptualized by Kaplan (1997) under the term 
“healthy-ill.” 
 
Both the healthy-ill and individuals at risk are exposed to surveillance modalities of 
medical gaze for the sake of preventing illness in the individual and for the sake of 
preventing it in future generations. I would call preventing disease in future generations 
intergenerational-ethics. Intergenerational ethics is one of the best examples through 
which we can understand how genetic diagnosis and testing create a new ethics of life 
and self. It determines the relations of individual with those to come. It brings up 
questions for the self about marriage, having children, insurance, applying for jobs, etc. 
Therefore, intergenerational ethics makes a simple gene unique to an individual into a 
matter of generational future. 
 
 Hence, somatic individuals, who are aware that they have bodies which they should 
take care of, are accompanied by individuals with an intergenerational conscience. These 
individuals equipped with genomic information and subjected to deployment of this 
information self-govern themselves through their individual genetic make-ups revealed 
by genetic diagnosis, testing and counseling. 
 
For those reasons, I would say that in the genetic experience, knowledge is not only 
determinative in terms of ordering the self by a power web but is also a key factor for 
the reordering of self by self. In the molecular politics of health, patients should be seen 
as active participants who are highly informed about themselves. It is this information 
through which selves define themselves, direct their strategies, constitute their 
personhood and identity and act upon themselves. Additionally, since this information is 
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the most trustworthy information in the history of humanity, it may be possible to assert 
that, in genetic experience, the relation between self and knowledge constrains the self 
and reduces its resistance to the effects of genomic information. The genomic 
information is deployed as the definite and exact truth of the self and its life. This truth 
is hardly deniable and excessively determinative since it is irreversibly placed by birth in 
the cells of the living body and is a package carrying the faith of the body.  
 
As a result, since this genomic information is constituted by several techniques of 
genomic science, it is these techniques of modern genetics that make individuals re-
visualize their identities and self-govern themselves. In brief, one can assert that in our 
current society – and probably in future societies – genetic diagnostic testing and 
counseling constitute the new technologies of self. Without any doubt, this argument is 
a natural result of a Foucaultian reading.  
 
By and large, the social science literature has considered genetics as a new apparatus of 
social control. However, this literature seems to miss another fundamental aspects of 
genetics, namely the constitution of the self. The importance of a Foucaultian reading 
becomes clear at this point, because it not only discloses the effects of genetics as an 
power apparatus; it also tries to demonstrate genetics as a self-technique through which 
individuals come to think of themselves. 
 
As a result of all of these arguments, it can be said that modern genetics serves and 
functions as a new body knowledge, which provides an archive of new information 
about the body and the social body. This archive supplies new resources for the self to 
constitute itself and for modern power to expose a political economy on the social 
body. 
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3.9 BIOINFORMATICS 
 
 
On the other hand, in the 1990s, through the Human Genome Project, whose goal is to 
map and sequence all of human DNA by 2005, this archive was turned into a database. 
In other words the mechanical storage of genomic information was displaced by digital 
storage (Thacker, 2002: 2).  
 
The digital storage of genomic information leads to a new conceptualization: 
bioinformatics. According to Thacker (2002: 4), “bioinformatics promises to deliver the 
tools which will make genomic science an information science, and propel the Human 
Genome Project into its next phase of ‘post-genomic science’.”  
 
This post-genomic phase corresponds to the link between biotech and infotech. Put 
differently, it is the combination of computer technologies and gene technologies that 
provides the biological-genetic databases (Thacker, 2002: 4). The biological-genetic 
database is not a simple digital tool. Instead it is an information-oriented technical 
apparatus regulating relations among the body, its molecular knowledge and power.  
 
In fact, both molecular politics and bioinformatics correspond to two things. First of all, 
molecular politics and bioinformatics disclose the final point that Foucault’s knowledge-
power structure has achieved. In other words, I would argue, bioinformatics and 
molecular politics have been the necessary and natural outcomes of a power that is 
knowledge-power. Through bioinformatics and molecular politics, knowledge–power 
surpasses and liberates itself from limited opportunities provided by science to deal with 
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mental illness, physical illness and sexuality in terms of social control. From now on, 
this knowledge-power possesses new apparatuses that are information sciences. 
Therefore, one can also say that the endeavor of knowledge-power to find itself 
channels to take form has ushered in a new phase in the history of science and scientific 
thought. This new phase is the phase of “information sciences” that provide much more 
painstaking social control. 
 
Secondly, I would argue that as well as being natural outcomes of a development of 
knowledge-power structure, both molecular and bioinformatic politics have also been 
the ultimate point for the myth of a healthy society, inherited from the Classical Age, 
which Foucault talks about in The Birth of the Clinic. This myth is the will to a perfectly 
healthy society purified from illnesses and thus also doctors and hospitals. Molecular 
politics, through studies of human cloning and genetic engineering, tries to make this 
myth a reality.  
 
3.10 IMMORTAL HUMANITY AND MOLECULAR PERFECTION 
 
 
Human cloning and genetic engineering, as argued by many (for example, Blank, 1981: 
70, Rollin, 1997), may provide for the replication and creation of adults certified healthy 
and individuals of great genius or beauty to improve the species. In other words, it is 
argued that genetic engineering through the possibility of eliminating bad genes and 
promoting good ones may purify the individual and the population from illnesses, 
doctors and hospitals alike.  
 
However, the first problem concerning this myth is, as Kence stated (2000: 25), 
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Which genes effects will be considered as illnesses? Who will decide 
which gene is good or bad? For humans a lot of different situation; from 
allergic reactions to heavy metabolic diseases, from depressivity to clinic 
mental problems; may be both good and bad under the influence of 
genes. For instance, the gene leading to sickle cell anemia may be 
beneficial where malaria is widespread.  
 
The second problem concerns the definition of health. The techniques of genetic 
engineering and improvement of the gene lead to a radical transformation. This radical 
transformation is the shift towards to perfection. Through genetic technologies, I would 
assert, being healthy will no longer be the exact opposite of being ill. Hereafter, being 
healthy or unhealthy will be determined in terms of perfection. Put differently, the 18th 
century nosology’s ideal physical state and normality may be transformed into molecular 
perfection.  
 
This molecular perfection may include several factors, from being a genius to being 
immortal. Nowadays, modern genetics argues the possibility of creating of humans who 
are immortal. Today gene technology, indeed, theoretically is capable of creating 
immortal living beings. Put differently, through genetic engineering the aging resourced 
dying can be impeded. In broader terms, the aging of living organisms is due to the 
division of cells. While cells are dividing they use thelomare, a particle found in 
chromosomes which is depleted during the division of cells. Due to this depletion, the 
division of cells is hindered and the living body dies. Through genetic engineering, the 
depleted thelomare may be replenished and thus theoretically, immortal humanity can 
be created.  
 
This idea of immortal humanity and attempts to make this a reality are related to the 
change of trajectory of power. As Foucault shows us, modern power focuses on life and 
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its processes rather than death and its fatality. Through modern genetics, this power 
over life tries to create a control on life processes that exceeds even the limits of death.  
 To summarize, this chapter shows us how man has been constituted as a molecular 
being and exposed to a multiple net of discursive formations. Within these discursive 
formations, on the one side, techniques of genes determine the relation of the self with 
itself and therefore constructs a new technology of self, ethopolitics. On the other side, 
techniques of genes determine the relation of body and power and therefore function as 
a new power apparatus and a new ethical substance, molecular politics.  
 
On both sides, what enables techniques of genes to affect the relations of self with self 
and the relations of body with power is the capacity of these techniques to reveal 
submicroscopic information and/or knowledge. This capacity differentiates medicine of 
genetics from all other types of medicines and constructs the trustworthiest knowledge 
of the body. In other words, the science of genes has produced the most effective 
knowledge-power structure in history, one whose mainstay is the deployment of 
genomic information. 
 
 The breakdown point, which constructed this knowledge-power structure, was the 
transition from negative eugeny to modern genetics. The transition to modern genetics 
was supplied in the 1960s by genetic counseling and testing studies. These techniques 
liberated hereditarily inferior ones from their content of guilt and turned bad genes into 
pathology. In the successive periods, several gene technologies have been improved to 
deal with this pathology, each of which increased the control of the body and the social 
body. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This study starts with a specific question: Genetics is a scientific concern, but what else  
besides? Similarly, this study finishes with a specific answer: Modern genetics is both a 
new channel through which modern power takes form and a new technology of self 
through which the self acts upon itself. In order to reach this answer and form a bridge 
back to the question that spurred the need for this study,  a specific tool has been used – 
namely, the Foucaultian approach.  
 
Therefore, this study has neither aimed to re-formulate what Foucault said nor tried to 
forge a deeper analysis of Foucaultian understanding. Instead, it has focused on the 
experience of genetics, and the Foucaultian approach has been considered only as a  
vehicle to help it pursue its goal. 
 
 At this point, a necessary question may arise: Why choose the Foucaultian approach 
and not others for examining modern genetics? The reason, I would argue, is that 
modern genetics is the prime exemplar of the power structure as laid out by Foucault. It 
is a knowledge-power structure, which is simultaneously disciplinary, discursive and 
normalizing.  
 
First of all, this knowledge-power structure, differing from the sovereign modality of 
power, is not a simple control over a simple community of bodies. The knowledge-
power structure deals with a live problem. In other words, it exercises its control within 
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the social body, which has numerous variables to be managed, such as habitation, 
nutrition, sexuality, mortality, fertility, and mental and physical health, plus all the other 
conditions of existence. Such a ramified characterization of the social body necessarily 
calls forth a need for the displacement of monarchial power or dominant class through 
a complex administration comprised of discursive formations, standards of normality 
and bodies of knowledge. What this new mood of administration does is to govern and 
manipulate these economic and social variables of the population.  
 
Indeed, in each historical experience, there exists the representation of different 
manageable variables. Similarly, what Foucault analyzes through these experiences is the 
management of variables of the body. In other words, all historical experiences from 
madness to sexuality are channels through which power takes form to exercise its 
control not over, but within the social body. 
 
On this basis, the Foucaultian reading of genetics starts firstly by conceptualizing the 
gene, DNA, and the molecule as the new variables of population and analyzing modern 
genetics as the new management of these new variables. This means, in sum, that 
genetics should be argued in terms of the new experience of modern society as well as 
the new channel that power takes as a form.  
 
Secondly, the way this knowledge-power structure deals with the variables of the social 
body and the body is not dependent on repression or prohibitions. Rather, the 
knowledge-power depends upon knowledge and knowings. Knowledge, on the other 
hand, provides a much more painstaking control.  
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On account of this, the Foucaultian reading of genetics reveals that modern genetics is 
the ultimate point reachable by Foucaultian knowledge-power. As a new body of 
knowledge, it supplies a great fount of knowledge and knowing, the most constant and 
trustworthy information stream in human history. In other words, genetics puts forward 
the somatic truth of humanity. Thus, the Foucaultian reading of genetics demonstrates 
that genetics is the newest and the most complex apparatus of the knowledge-power 
structure. 
 
 Thirdly, this knowledge-power comes to surface within discursive formations. 
Discursive formations, in relation both to each other and non-discursive formations 
(such as institutions), tell the individual subject what and who is normal and what and 
who abnormal. In other words, they are the representors for the standards of normality.  
On account of this, the Foucaultian reading of genetics shows that modern genetics is 
the new discourse in which genetic and molecular norms structure the normal and the 
abnormal. As a natural consequence, modern genetics is a separating technique. This 
separating technique, critically, has produced a new category regarding molecular soma: 
the asymptomatically ill and/or healthy-ill, namely those who do not develop a disease 
or exhibit its symptoms but who nevertheless carry it.  
 
In fact this new category, healthy-ill, serves to shed light on three very important and 
interrelated points. The first point concerns surveillance and/or the gaze. Knowledge-
power, like the architecture of the panopticon, sees everything without ever being seen 
itself. This panopticonal gaze supplies a continuous check-up of the subject, its 
correction, its supervision, its measurement, its separation and localization. Actually 
modern genetics lies in the very center of surveillance. It puts under surveillance the 
innermost structure of the individual subject and thus leads to an absolute realization of 
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the panopticonal gaze. In a word, modern genetics has constructed the molecular gaze. 
It is this gaze, which enables modern power to reach the very details of the molecular 
somas. The molecular gaze reshapes life at a very novel level, that of the 
submicroscopic.  
 
The second point that the healthy-ill sheds light on is the fact that re-visioning of life at 
the chromosomal/submicroscopic levels creates a new identity, a biological one. It 
means the individual subjects understand that they are molecular beings and so become 
somatic individuals. This in fact corresponds to the new regulations, molecular politics, 
of the relation between the body and power. Molecular politics, on the other hand, has 
produced a new ethical substance. 
 
The third point concerns the relation between molecular knowledge and the self. Those 
who are healthy-ill should be considered active participants in their genetic diagnosis 
and treatment. They are told about their molecularity and advised by numerous 
professionals, insurers, employers, and doctors. This information and advice not only 
construct the ethical substance but also affect the relation of the body with itself. Put 
differently, the deployment of genomic information through genetic counseling and 
testing produces a new self-technique, ethopolitics, through which individuals become 
responsible for their own somas, molecules and diseases, and they understand that not 
only medical authorities but they individually should take care of their own molecular 
somas for the sake of individual improvement.  
 
These all, laid out briefly, are the concluding remarks of the application of a Foucaultian 
approach to modern genetics. Under our thesis, this approach depends primarily upon 
an archaeological understanding differing markedly from the historical approach. An 
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archaeological understanding takes dislocations, transformations and breaks – which I 
would call breakdown points – as seriously as it does the locations and continuities that 
are the main focuses of a historical understanding. These breakdowns are positive 
elements of an archaeological gaze since they lay bare the transformations of discursive 
formations and replacements of different variables, such as mental health, under a 
power network. Moreover, in the archaeological approach the privileged position of the 
human subject is displaced by discursive formations and their relations both with each 
other and with non-discursive formations. These relations demonstrate change and 
discontinuity, and in turn the changes and discontinuities reveal a knowledge-power 
structure. As a result, I would say that an archaeological approach depends primarily on 
analyses of the constitution of discourses and knowledge-power.  
 
Consequently, the archaeology of genetics, through examining the gene as an object of 
certain forms of knowledge and a target of bodies of knowledge, shows that genetic 
make-up is a means of access to the life of the soma and to the control of molecular 
conditions of the population.  
 
Thus, it can be said that modern genetics is an apparatus of modern power that controls 
and shapes the body’s genetic make-up through both creating an ethical substance and 
constructing a new self-technology.  
 
 Before concluding, one should note that this study also demonstrates how not only is a 
Foucaultian approach the best way to examine modern genetics, but also modern 
genetics can help us to understand the Foucaultian approach. For the history of genetics 
is the history of a multiplication of discourses in which come to the surface the 
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strategies of disciplining, normalization, separation and the structure of knowledge-
power.  
 
In summation, this study demonstrates how the molecularized body is born in the 
politics of controlling the social body, and then gives birth to molecular politics and 
ethopolitics. Put differently, the genomic sign is not only a biological construct but also 
a social one that should be understood in the context of the politics of life.  
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